Introduction
The
idea that marriage can be defined in terms of a ‘loving, committed
relationship’ instead of as the union of a male and a female is part of a
larger, philosophical disagreement. This essay makes this point with
respect to the different philosophical approaches of Plato, Aristotle, and the
Stoics. The agreement of Jewish and Christian philosophy is closest to
the Stoics: a theology of creation compares favourably to the Stoic notion of
living according to nature (natural law, not one’s personal inclinations).
The attempt by some to redefine marriage so that it can include
homosexual relationships is consistent with philosophical alternatives in
Paul's day—which Paul did not accept. It
is a shift away from the doctrine of creation and from concrete theologizing in
general that is fundamental to Christian theology.
Plato’s
Universals and Particulars
For Plato,
particulars represented—in whatever inadequate form—the ideal or
universal. So, for example, we might say
that some particular thing or person is beautiful because it represents or
partakes of the ideal, Beauty in itself.
In the Republic, Plato sought
to define ‘Justice’ and then apply the ideal to the particular by describing a
particular republic that would express this virtue. He also understood the various ideals to be
expressions of one, particular ideal: the Good.
Furthermore, humans desire to know the universals; their souls desire to
rise up on wings to perceive these absolute universals in themselves. Yet the involvement in the material world of
particulars pulls them down, and they fail to do this until, in death, their
souls are finally released. In his
famous cave allegory (Republic Bk.
7), Plato compared life in the realm of particulars to chained persons in a
cave looking at shadows from the world outside on their cave wall: distorted
figures, colourless, difficult to define, and so on. This is the life we are said to live in this
world, and we continuously struggle to grasp the ideals themselves in our
chained existence of the material world.
Universals
found in the Particulars: Aristotle’s Alteration to Plato
Plato’s argument
about universals and particulars is an important philosophical underpinning for
Western culture as a whole. We have
never shed this perspective in Western culture, even if alternatives present
themselves. One alternative came quickly
in the philosophy of Plato’s pupil, Aristotle.
Aristotle accepts that one may speak of ideals and their particular
expressions, but he distinguishes himself from Plato in saying that we
essentially need to be more practical in our enquiry on these matters. We end up disputing what is ‘Beauty’ or ‘Happiness’,
for example (cf. Nichomachean Ethics 1.4),
and so we should discuss the particular ends of certain things. This leads Aristotle to talk of three
different kinds of life, dependent on which end one pursues: the life of pleasure,
the life of politics (meaning a good arrangement for community, not ‘politics’
as we typically use the word today), or the life of contemplation (Nichomachean Ethics 1.5). (Note that these options relate to the three cardinal
virtues of temperance (which holds back vices that arise in the pursuit of
pleasure), courage (discussed in terms of honour in politics), and wisdom.) The
pursuit of ideals within particulars rather than abstracted from them is an
important philosophical shift from Plato.
So, for example, one finds that particular things have particular forms
of beauty. One cannot abstract ‘Beauty’
from a beautiful girl and a beautiful sunset—they are beautiful in relation to
the different objects themselves.
Plato
vs. Aristotle on Sexuality
Practically, this
philosophical distinction could lead to different approaches to sexuality. In Phaedrus
(251a), Plato distinguishes the love of young men by older men (pederasty)
along these lines: it is good if the older man sees the young man’s beauty and
pursues the relationship as a pursuit of the ideal, Beauty; it is bad if the
older man merely pursues sexual pleasure and gratification.
When proponents of
same-sex unions or marriage today argue on the grounds that intimate unions are
good if pursued in ‘loving and committed’ relationships, they are arguing along
the lines of Plato. They are
distinguishing the particular good of marriage or of sex from the ideals of
Love and Commitment. This abstraction of
ideals from particulars is precisely what Aristotle questioned in his tutor’s
philosophy.
If we were to
follow a more Aristotelian approach, we would need to look more carefully at
the intended ‘ends’ (goals) of particular things (sex, marriage). Aristotle’s tendency to examine particulars
in terms of their ends rather than by trying to define an ideal in itself could
lead to an understanding of different genders than simply the male and
female. He says, e.g.,
Physiognomonica 6: Shrill, soft, broken tones mark the speech of the pathic, for such
a voice is found in women and is congruous with the pathic’s [the passive partner in a homosexual relationship] nature.[1]
However, Aristotle
also could understand homosexuality in terms of habits, not just a person’s
natural tendencies (Aristotle, Nichomachian
Ethics 7.5), and his ethics did not simply affirm a person’s inclinations
without also defining what is Just (i.e., the right balance of the virtues in a
person and society) and Noble.
Nevertheless, finding ideals related to particulars inclines one to a
possible different assessment of sexuality and marriage.
Natural
and Unnatural
The Stoics, in
particular, spoke of living in accordance with nature (kata physin), not against nature (para physin).
They were not alone in this conviction: a dictum of Aristotle in Politics
is, ‘Nothing contrary to nature [para
physin] is noble’ (7.1325b.10). By
this, he did not mean, as one might be inclined to believe from the above
discussion, a person’s own nature but nature in a wider sense—what is true of
the natural world. Yet Stoics built
their philosophy more closely on living according to nature. If Plato’s philosophy could allow some
element of a person constructing alternative relationships to heterosexual
marriage when the goal was the pursuit of universals (such as Beauty in
homosexual or heterosexual relationships), Stoic philosophy opposed whatever
was contrary to nature.
Epictetus, a Stoic, says, ‘…
convince me of this that you acted naturally, and I will convince you that
everything which takes place according to nature takes place rightly’ (Discourses 1.11).[2] In this, he was following a fundamental dogma
of Stoicism. Applied to homosexuality,
he could therefore condemn the act and lifestyle of both the active and the passive man:
What
is lost by the victim of unnatural lust? His manhood. And by the agent? Beside
a good many other things he also loses his manhood no less than the other (Discourses 2.10).
For Jews and Christians, with their doctrine of
creation rather than pursuit of abstract ideals, Stoic philosophy came closer
than other philosophies of the day. Both
recognised the created order as a basis for determining what is right and wrong,
just and unjust, good and bad, etc.
Indeed, Paul does not condemn only the passive partner in a homosexual
relationship but both active and passive partners because both are acting
against nature—as Epictetus says, each ‘loses his manhood’. This is not the way God created the world,
and homosexuality is ‘against nature’—the same phrase used by both Aristotle
and Epictetus (Romans 1.26).
Conclusion
A definitive feature of liberal theology is its
abstraction from particulars. The more
one abstracts concepts in theology, the more theologians can reapply ideals in
a variety of ways. Abstracted ideals of
Justice, Freedom, and Love allow theologians to shape them any which way they
choose, and that without being bound to the meaning of sacred texts. The move away from the concrete and
particular is fundamental to liberalism.
The cross, for example, comes to stand for certain ideals rather than
being an actual substitutionary sacrifice.
The resurrection, one regularly hears, did not really take place, but
the notion of renewed life can be preached to help people negotiate the facts
of their life struggles (an existential interpretation). And so, too, marriage, now defined not specifically
as the union of a male and a female but as something more abstract and
expressing ideals of Love and Commitment, is being touted as Christian. It is not.
Christianity is in essence concrete, as
concrete as the belief in the incarnation.
Jesus was God made man. Meaning is
bound by authoritative Scripture, not vague principles derived from the text
and then applied in some new way—even against what the Biblical text
specifically says. And just so, a truly
Christian view of sex is Biblically grounded and is concretely defined as
appropriate only within the marital relationship of a male and a female using
their body parts in the way they were intended by the God of creation. Note the language of ‘natural use’ (physikēn chrēsin) in what Paul says in
Romans 1.26-27—not ‘natural intercourse’ (NRSV) or ‘natural relations’ (ESV,
NIV)—over against what is para physin (against
nature) in Romans 1.26 in description of lesbianism and male
homosexuality:
Romans 1:26 For this reason God gave them up to degrading passions.
Their women exchanged natural intercourse [physikēn chrēsin] for unnatural [para physin]....
The construction of ethics around ideals rather than
the concreteness of nature, the historical realities of redemptive history,
and, for that matter, God’s revealed Word, is a non-Christian philosophizing. Docetists (denying Jesus’ incarnation) and
Gnostics both attempted to take Christianity in this direction in the early
years of the Church, just as much as liberals try to do so in our day. But all such efforts are fatally flawed as
fundamentally unchristian. Next time you
say the Apostle’s Creed, think about how concrete the confession of the
Christian faith is; it is not a list of abstract values and Platonic
ideals. Just so, Christians affirm a
very specific definition of marriage between a man and a woman, not some set of ideals
in relationships that can be applied to several different kinds of unions.
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