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Theological Education as Tradition Enquiry

 

Introduction

A great challenge facing the Church in the world lies in theological education.  Just what does this mean?  Some phrase this in equally general terms as ‘leadership training,’ which is, sadly, a step in the wrong direction as it removes the word ‘theological’ and it conceives of ministry as ‘leadership.’  Others conceive of theological education as an education in ‘religion,’ that is, a faith-less education in academia that is unrelated to the Church.  Still others mean by ‘theological education’ an action oriented education in ‘social justice’ or ‘public theology’ that has little to do with the interpretation of sacred texts or with the history of the interpreting community.  Relatedly, some understand ‘theological education’ as contemporary and contextual studies that are phenomenological, pragmatic, and grounded in the social sciences.  This approach may or may not engage with the canonically authoritative Scriptures or the Church’s history, but, if it does, it typically uses these anecdotally, as one might any other example.  The Church’s Scriptures and tradition are replaced with the gathering of data and the analysis of that data through some field in the social sciences (political science, sociology, anthropology, psychology, management, and economics).

Over against these approaches to theological education, this essay outlines some characteristics of theological education as tradition enquiry.  The characteristics of tradition enquiry were described in a book by Alasdair MacIntyre on ethics, first published in 1990.[1]  MacIntyre describes three rival versions of moral enquiry that correspond with modernity, postmodernity, and tradition.  Distinctions will be made between these, below, but a general understanding of the three versions of enquiry, which MacIntyre insists are incommensurable, are as follows.  Modernist enquiry, which MacIntyre calls ‘Encyclopedic,’ is enquiry that begins with no set of beliefs and seeks to establish belief through scientific enquiry.  Objective truth is possible, and all truth is ‘encyclopedic’ in the sense that it is cumulative, inter-disciplinary, and coherent.  Postmodern enquiry, which MacIntyre calls ‘genealogy,’ is relativistic, opposes metanarratives that account for everything (it is non-encyclopedic), and affirms locally constructed, functional understandings of knowledge and beliefs.  Tradition enquiry also begins with presuppositions, but it seeks to move from faith to reason, believing in objective truth.  Encyclopedia prioritises scientific study within the university, genealogy prioritises the social sciences and sees the ‘university’ more as a ‘diversity’ of perspectives and methodologies that are not coherent, cumulative, or authoritative, but that appreciates inter-disciplinary studies as a feature of diversity.  Tradition enquiry is favourable for the study of a theological tradition.  The tension between the Church and the modern university lay in the antagonisms that arose between faith and science, but both agreed on objective truth.  The tension between the Church and postmodern ‘diversity’ is the latter’s rejection of authoritative texts, historical enquiry, and objective truth, and its preference of the social scientific methodologies for merely descriptive studies.

One further feature of the postmodern turn is a focus on ethnicities and audiences.  Instead of asking what an author in Scripture meant in the context in which a text was written, postmodern reading of Scripture favours the reader: what meaning does the audience make of the text for its own contextual and contemporary situation?  This leads to a rejection of Biblical Studies and Historical Theology in the theological curriculum, and replacing these are studies pertaining to the readers and their contexts.  The meaning of texts is shifted from the author to the reader or readers, and the theological curriculum increasingly rejects Biblical studies, Church history, and theology, replacing this emphasis with ministry studies and public theology (an action oriented study of some sort that seeks common ground between the Church and society, such as in ‘social justice’ or ‘inter-faith dialogue.’)

With this introduction to the three rival versions of enquiry, this essay turns next to a description of tradition enquiry as laid out by Alasdair MacIntyre.  ‘Tradition’ enquiry should not be equated with Christian theology: the approach could be applied to any religious tradition.  However, MacIntyre primarily had in mind the Thomistic tradition stemming from Thomas Aquinas.  One might easily see, or should appreciate, that different traditions will oppose one another.  An orthodox Christian may find considerable room to disagree with another orthodox Christian in a different trajectory of the tradition, such as Roman Catholics and Southern Baptists.  They will find areas where they agree and disagree.  This will become more pronounced as significantly different traditions are in view, such as two religions, articulate their views and practices.  One must, therefore, not only define theological education as tradition enquiry but also clarify which tradition one has in view.  The following essay only outlines tradition enquiry in general and does not take that extra, necessary step.  Thus, the point being made is that, amidst calls for more ‘theological education,’ we need to understand that this will not be served by the universities, whether Modern or Postmodern, but can only be served by the Church with a clear understanding of the tradition of faith and practices that it seeks to study and pass on to the next generation.  Nor will theological education be adequate when pursued by denominations that attack their own traditions, as the mainline, Protestant denominations have been doing for a half century or more.

The Characteristics of Tradition Enquiry[2]

'Tradition' offers an alternative to encyclopaedic and genealogical versions of enquiry.  Alasdair MacIntyre defines 'tradition' as an ‘historically extended, socially embodied argument,’[3] or ‘an argument extended over time in which certain fundamental agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict’—that inside and that outside the tradition.[4]  Over against the modernist understanding of reason as thinking without taking perspectives into account (so that reason can be universal and impersonal), MacIntyre avers that

 '…reason can only move towards being genuinely universal and impersonal insofar as it is neither neutral nor disinterested,… [and] membership in a particular type of moral community, one from which fundamental dissent has to be excluded, is a condition for genuinely rational enquiry and more especially for moral and theological enquiry.'[5]

The history of this approach to moral enquiry stretches from Socrates to a time after Thomas Aquinas. MacIntyre's description of tradition includes the following points (my enumeration follows).

(1) Philosophical enquiry was perceived as requiring a prior commitment to a certain perspective.  This was phrased in terms of making oneself an apprentice to a craft (tecnh,), and so philosophy involved the practice (e;rgon) of a craft to achieve what is good—the good for me at my stage of learning as opposed to what is good without qualification, and the good for this craft as opposed to what appears good.[6]  Furthermore, one entering a craft becomes part of the history of that craft.  In saying so, MacIntyre argues that one within a tradition is part of its dynamic flow.  Indeed, successful enquiry itself can only be written retrospectively and is therefore open to review at a later date.[7]  Encyclopaedists, by contrast, believe in a neutral history: the past is waiting to be discovered, independent of characteristics from some particular point of view.[8]  Tradition recognises that history is always written from the historian's perspective.

(2) Tradition has a narrative view of history.  MacIntyre speaks of a narrative structure to different theories of history, entailing different views on how actions and transactions of actual social life are embodied.  The encyclopaedist believes that the narrative structure involves the progression of reason.  This denigrates the past and appeals to timeless principles separate from the traditions that shaped them.  Tradition is to be sifted by our standards, and there is no need for a prior commitment to religious belief or tradition to understand these principles.  Genealogy, on the other hand, seeks to disclose what the encyclopaedic narrative has concealed by undermining that narrative and offering its own version of history.  Tradition, however, seeks to learn from the past by identifying and moving toward a telos more adequately in the present.    To do this, it asks questions such as the following: What is the telos of human beings?  What is right action towards the telos?  What are the virtues that issue in right action?  What are the laws that order human relationships so that we may possess these virtues?[9]  Tradition also recognises the political (i.e., roles and social life) dimensions to tradition.

 MacIntyre says that

 'modern moral philosophy has in general been blind to the complementary character of narrative and theory both in moral enquiry and in the moral life itself.  In moral enquiry we are always concerned with the question: what type of enacted narrative would be the embodiment, in the actions and transactions of actual social life, of this particular theory?…the encyclopaedic, the genealogical, and the Thomistic tradition-constituted standpoints confront one another not only as rival moral theories but also as projects for constructing rival forms of moral narrative.'[10]

Lucian, the second century satirist, saw this clearly: in depicting the various views of current philosophies as slaves to be sold in the market, he required each to describe the type of life (enacted narrative) which accompanies his understanding of the world rather than offer rational arguments in favour of each philosophy (Philosophies for Sale).

(3) Tradition locates authority in (a) a given community (e.g., Thomistic scholarship), (b) in authoritative texts (e.g., Scripture), and (c) in a tradition of interpretation of these texts by the community through history.[11]  The encyclopaedist’s version of moral enquiry entails a separation of the individual, reasoning subject from authority, while the genealogist’s version resists all authority.  Tradition, on the other hand, requires thinking in community—apprenticing and practising one’s craft in the guild.  Tradition also appreciates the temporal reference of reasoning: the encyclopaedist seeks timeless, universal and objective truths, whereas tradition understands truth with respect to its history so far.  It makes claims about objective truth, but it makes those claims not from some neutral ground but from its own faith tradition.

 To share in the rationality of a craft requires sharing in the contingencies of its history, understanding its story as one’s own, and finding a place for oneself as a character in the enacted dramatic narrative which is that story so far.[12]

Thus, one must become committed to a certain community with its unique tradition rather than work by means of reasoning from first principles, and one will find that the subject for investigation is not simply our tradition but ourselves.

In making this case for the nature of tradition as a means of enquiry, MacIntyre examines the Augustinian tradition through to Thomas Aquinas’ combination of this tradition with the Aristotelian tradition.  Some further points helping to describe tradition emerge from this survey.

(4) Tradition has a clear understanding of the different roles of the reader and teachers in interpretation. Interpretation of these texts requires ‘a prerational reordering of the self …before the reader can have an adequate standard by which to judge what is a good reason and what is not’.[13]  This argument stems from Augustine’s understanding of the will as perverted, over against Aristotle’s trust that the mind will seek out the good and, having discovered it, do it.  But for Augustine, a transformation of the reader needs to take place in order to read with understanding.

If the reader needs a prerational reordering of the self in order to read rightly, what one needs is a trusted teacher to guide one during initial readings.  Humility, then, is a required virtue of the reader of texts and in education.  Contrast a Nietzschean opposition to such humility before tradition: what Nietzsche called for was a ‘nobility of instinct’.

(5) Tradition enquiry has a different understanding of reasoning.  It uses dialectic, arguing towards first principles.  Reasoning is ‘on the way’, it is exploratory, representing the state of the craft at this time in its history.  Encyclopaedia, on the contrary, argues from first principles and concerns itself with methods and principles.  These methods and principles are thought to be without influence from the interpreter's perspective, and the means of communication in education is therefore the lecture, a rather straight-forward presentation of facts which the student must learn.  Questions and answers in such lectures are for clarification, not for probing the argument through dialectic enquiry.  MacIntyre writes that the genealogist view of the lecture is that it is only an episode in a narrative of conflicts.  In fact, the lecture is not appropriate for Postmodern education.  Group projects and discussion make better sense on the view that affirms relativism, local truth, group identities, and our constructions of reality.  Tradition, on the other hand, sees the lecturer and his or her audience as interpreters of texts to be dialectically explored because both agree on an authority beyond themselves—the Divinely revealed, authoritative Scriptures.[14]

If reasoning is 'on the way', then tradition is incorrectly understood when it is thought to be an encrustation of the past.  MacIntyre insists that tradition is dynamic: it develops as any 'craft' facing its own questions arising out of its past history.

Conclusion

This essay has sought to argue for a clear understanding that theological education needs to be education within a tradition.  The more general claim that all education lies within a tradition stands behind this claim but is not in focus.  If anything is to be a matter of ‘tradition enquiry,’ certainly theological studies is.  However, theological education has been pulled and pushed in various directions away from a study of a faith community articulating who it is, what it believes, what it practices, and how it relates to outsiders.  Both Modernity and Postmodernity have distracted the Church from its primary focus and contribution as a tradition.  Also, as the Church itself has fragmented and become confused in regard to its relationship to its own tradition, its understanding of theological education has been distorted one way or another.  The first step to rectifying this tremendous problem is to recognise that theological education is tradition enquiry.

As orthodox Evangelicals, we belong to several sub-traditions that come together because we are close enough in our understandings of orthodoxy and Reformational theology, as well as in our history of missions and the Church.  We have much in common and should have enough in common to cooperate in large part with one another in theological education.  We have virtually nothing in common with liberal Christianity, let alone the secular university and the interest in religious studies that resist the commitments of faith-based enquiry.



[1] Alasdair MacIntyre,  Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre Dame, IL: University of Notre Dame, 1990).

[2] From this point to the conclusion, the essay is a slight revision of a section from Rollin G. Grams, Rival Versions of Theological Enquiry (Prague: International Baptist Theological Seminary, 2005).

[3] Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 222.

[4] Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice?  Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 12.

[5] Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, pp. 59f.

[6] Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, pp. 61f.

[7] Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, p. 150.

[8] Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, p. 152.

[9] Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, p. 80.

[10] Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, p. 80.

[11] In medieval religious education, tradition developed as questiones related to the text.  These questions were first written in the margins of the Biblical text and, over time, were expanded into accompanying texts.  Questions arising from commentary on the text pertained to the three or four senses a text of Scripture was thought to have: the plain historical, the moral or tropological, the allegorical or mystical, and (sometimes added) the anagogical or spiritually educational sense (MacIntyre, p. 85).  Abbot Hugh of St. Victor (1125-1141) developed this Medieval approach to the text by emphasising the importance of the plain historical text and unifying the senses through encouraging a curriculum covering all three: the plain historical meaning calls for exegesis based on a knowledge of history and geography, the moral sense calls for a study of moral theology, the allegorical calls for a study of theological doctrine, and the tropological calls for a study of what work we have to do in the natural world and an understanding of the natural world so that we can do our work in the world well.  If one ignores the problematic sensus plenior involved in a search for the four senses of a text, these are similar to the four tasks of theology that occupy a community in its use of Scripture.

[12] Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, p. 65.

[13] Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, p. 82.

[14] MacIntyre notes that medieval theology also made use of distinctions (distinctiones) in types of sense, a method which made radical intellectual dissent possible, as in the case of Abelard.  This point overlaps with the history of Roman Catholic tradition after Abelard in Aquinas’ combining two distinct traditions in his Summa Theologica.

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