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On the Impossibility of Good Laws without Religious Devotion and Living according to Nature (Cicero)

We have reached a crisis of law in Western society, one predictable enough in light of the rejection of religion in one way or another.  The crisis stems from not having an understanding of what stands over law.  Lawmakers and judges often say, ‘We are a nation under the law?’, but what happens when the law itself is under nothing?

This brief essay raises the question, ‘Can Western society actually be a society of good laws once it gives up respectfulness or even reverence for religion and nature/creation?’  The question is not only asked regarding Christianity, although as a question for Western society in the 21st century, it is largely about the recently emerged, post-Christian context.  The essay will explore the arguments of Marcus Tullius Cicero, a renowned Roman legislature in the first century BC.  He argues that a society’s laws must fit into a wider cultural context that honours the gods and is willing to live according to nature, not against it.

In On the Laws, Cicero argues that wardens of the state (lawmakers and judges) must believe in the gods because laws must be derived from nature, which they created.  He says,

But if rights were established by peoples’ orders, if by leading men’s decrees, if by judges’ verdicts, there would be a right to rob, a right to commit adultery, a right to substitute false wills if those things were approved by the votes or resolutions of a multitude. But if there is such power in the opinions and orders of the foolish that the nature of things is changed by their votes, why don’t they establish that bad and ruinous things should be held to be good and salutary things? Or if law can make right out of wrong, can’t the same law make good out of bad? But we can divide good law from bad by no other standard than that of nature (On the Laws I.43-44).[1]

Cicero's view that civil laws must be based on natural law established by the gods follows the earlier argument by Plato along the same lines (Laws 10.885-897): the argument was well-established over the centuries.  In On the Laws, Cicero defines good law as prudence found in the order of nature:

law is highest reason, implanted in nature, which orders those things that ought to be done and prohibits the opposite (1.18).

The reason for such a definition is to distinguish natural law from civil law.  Cicero warns against laws passed by legislation without any grounding in nature but only based upon group interests.  Platonic, Aristotelian, Cynic, and Stoic philosophical schools held that nature is not chaotic but ordered, and our goal in life is to live in accordance with it.  To live against nature is to live against wisdom (like stepping off a cliff in defiance of gravity, to give an example).

In Cicero’s work, On the Republic, the speaker, Laelius, states

'True law is correct reason congruent with nature, spread among all persons, constant, everlasting’ (3.27).

Here we have five criteria for ‘true law’: it must be reasonable, accord with nature, be universal, be constant, and be everlasting.  True law is distinguished from the more ephemeral laws of society that get passed and repealed for expediency, like traffic laws, or to protect factional interests, like voting laws.  Only laws established in accordance with nature, as decreed by the gods, are true laws.  Many societies pass bad laws, like the ignorant and inefficient physician prescribing deadly medication, Cicero notes.

Good and bad laws are distinguished by the standards of Nature (On the Laws I.44).  Cicero warned:

But if rights were established by peoples’ orders, if by leading men’s decrees, if by judges’ verdicts, there would be a right to rob, a right to commit adultery, a right to substitute false wills if those things were approved by the votes or resolutions of a multitude (On the Laws 1.43).

How can a society avoid such bad lawmaking?  Cicero’s definition of law is that 'law is a distinction between just and unjust things, modeled on nature, the most ancient and chief of all things, to which human laws are directed that visit the wicked with punishment and defend and protect the good' (On the Laws 2.13).  His point is that civil laws unrelated to natural law should not even rise to the level of being considered legitimate laws.

Moreover, above natural law are the gods.  He avers that the gods rule over nature (1.21) and that (civil) law must be modelled on nature (2.7).  He says, ‘the chief and ultimate law is the mind of god compelling or forbidding all things by reason.’  Thus, law is not ‘thought out by human intellects’ or ‘some resolution of peoples’ but is ‘something eternal that rules the whole universe through the wisdom of commanding and prohibiting’ (On the Laws 2.8). 

Cicero also links types of law to ethics, that is, to the cardinal virtues.  He says that laws concern four areas: the pursuit of truth, the conservation of organised society, the pursuit of a noble spirit and the desire for orderliness and moderation of everything.  These types of law are related to the cardinal virtues of wisdom (or, as he says, to ‘what is true’), justice, courage (championing the right cause, Cicero, On Duties I.62) and temperance or self-control (I.15).  The virtues, in turn, give rise to duties, understood as the right and honourable things to do.  From this trajectory, finally, may arise civil laws.  Taking three works of Cicero together (On the Gods, On Duties, On the Laws), we might outline his proposal for the relation of the gods to nature to ethics to civil law as follows:

God/s à Nature à Moral Law à Virtues à Duties à Right & Honourable à Civil Laws

Since ‘the chief and ultimate law is the mind of god compelling or forbidding all things by reason,’   law is not ‘thought out by human intellects’ or ‘some resolution of peoples’ but is ‘something eternal that rules the whole universe through the wisdom of commanding and prohibiting’ (On the Laws II.8).  Cicero was wary of what we might call today a separation of Church and State into separate domains.  This separation in, say, the United States, has increasingly led to the privatization of religion, pushing it out of public space and society.  This separation only increases the more diverse a population becomes.  Perhaps we might appreciate this separation in certain ways, but Cicero’s arguments might also compel us to approve, at least, his concern that a state does not become atheistic or areligious.  We might further observe how the affirmation of religion in the governance of a state fares better when the religion is Christianity rather than any religion.  For his part, Cicero insists on laws promoting religious piety and practices, for without this all law diminishes into the powerplays of the political party in momentary ascendancy.

If Western society continues to dig its heels into a post-religious culture, its laws will increasingly be suspect.  Society will be less one under law and more one that manipulates law towards political ends.  Moreover, laws will be passed to advance group interests.  Most especially, laws will be passed that are actually against nature, such as the hideous law equating heterosexual marriage with same-sex marriage.  Indeed, a post-religious culture is an antinatural culture.

Orthodox Christians are deeply concerned with laws passed in post-Christian, Western societies that are against nature.  A case in point is the law in America that recognised same-sex ‘marriage’ (Obergefell v. Hodges).  The Chief Justice, John Roberts, dissented from it,[2] and it passed by only one vote on the nine-member court.  Like the infamous abortion ruling in 1973, Roe v. Wade, a single member on a nine-member court upended the entire society.  In both cases, the majority failed to understand the relationship between law and nature.

A law allowing or defending same-sex 'marriage' is a law that is not only out of accord with nature; it is a law establishing as law what is in fact against nature.  Such a law fails each of Laelius's five criteria for good laws.  It is unreasonable in defying the meaning of ‘marriage’.  Marriage does not equate to close relationships or sexual activity, nor is it a small unit of persons involved in other close activities.  It is not merely a contract or covenant. That which elevates marriage and family to something higher than these is where law is construed with respect to nature—to God’s intentions in creation.  Marriage has to do with a ‘one flesh’ kinship between a male and a female for the purpose of multiplying.  The ‘one flesh’ (Genesis 2.24) understanding is not any kinship relationship but, as the narrative in the text underscores, is a male-female ‘one flesh’ bonding that separates the man (and woman, implied) from parental relationships, and therefore it is a sexual bonding that produces a new family.   Same-sex ‘marriage’ only mimics this.  Intercourse is purely sexual passion apart from the potential of producing children.  The telos of sex is rejected.  It also mimics marriage in taking children from those who have produced them according to nature.  It redefines ‘parents’ from being mother and father to being merely two adults.  Instead of understanding love to develop in a family around natural relationships, it begins with erotic love that tries to introduce marital and familial relationships.  Same-sex ‘marriage’ is, ultimately, a mimicry of marriage that is parasitic on true marriages and natural reproduction.

In Plato’s Laws, his Athenian spokesperson proposes laws against sex outside marriage between a man and a woman on the grounds that these practices are against nature.  He says,

Were one to follow the guidance of nature and adopt the law of the old days before Laius  — I mean, to pronounce it wrong that male should have to do carnally with youthful male as with female, and to fetch his evidence from the life of the animals, pointing out that male does not touch male in this way because the action is unnatural, his contention would surely be a telling one, yet it would be quite at variance with the practice of your societies (Laws VIII.836).[3]

Cicero, we have seen, cautions against civil laws that have no higher source than legislative or judicial pronouncements: ‘But truly the most foolish thing is to think that everything is just that has been approved in the institutions or laws of peoples’ (On the Laws 1.42).  He adds that both laws and what is considered socially honourable and disgraceful must be rooted in nature (1.45).  Typical language to describe homosexuality in antiquity was that homosexuals lived ‘against nature’ (so also Paul in Romans 1.26-27).  A law claiming that homosexual marriage is legal amounts to being nothing more than a bad civil law establishing a dishonourable practice as though it was grounded in nature when it is not.

The example given, a civil law establishing same-sex cohabiting as equivalent to heterosexual marriage, calling both ‘marriage’, is not the only example of Western society’s struggle in a post-Christian era with law.  Other antinatural practices raising social concern are: gene editing, abortion, so-called ‘artificial intelligence’, laws against ‘conversion therapy’ for persons with same-sex attraction who want to change, inventions of genders other than male and female, distinguishing biological sex from gender identity, cloning, etc.  Laws against religious devotion are more complex, since some religions incorporate wicked practices and attempt to protect them in the name of religion.  Yet a society that regularly attempts to squash religion in favour of a kind of public atheism/private religion distinction is the sort of society that Plato, Cicero, and Christians in the West need to oppose.  In Europe, ‘hate speech’ laws are regularly used to silence Christian beliefs and practices.  Thus, the crisis facing the West today is one of law, the crisis of the impossibility of establishing good laws without religious devotion and living according to nature.  (The future of Europe and Great Britain, and other Western cultures, already in evidence, is increasingly one posing a whole different sort of crisis of law as Muslim immigration takes a foothold.)



[1] Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Republic and On the Laws, trans. David Fott (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).

[2] Cf. Jack Jenkins, ‘Abortion fight won, conservative Christians mimic Dobbs tactics to go after same-sex marriage,’ Religion News Service (March 26, 2025); Adelle M. Banks, ‘Southern Baptists seek overturning of same-sex marriage,’ Religion News Service (June 11, 2025).  See the Southern Baptist's resolution, 'On Restoring Moral Clarity through God’s Design for Gender, Marriage, and the Family': https://static.foxnews.com/foxnews.com/content/uploads/2025/06/5-on-restoring-moral-clarity-through-gods-design-for-gender-marriage-and-the-family.pdf.

[3] Plato, The Laws of Plato, trans. Alfred Edward Taylor (London: Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1934).

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