Justice as the Right Ordering in the Soul and the State. Essay 8 of Justice in the State: Comparisons between Plato’s Republic and the West

 

Socrates’ discussion of justice in Plato’s Republic considers how this cardinal virtue relates to the other cardinal virtues, and how these virtues relate to both the individual soul and the state in the same ways (cf. book 9). 

The four cardinal virtues are wisdom (prudence), courage (bravery), temperance (self-control), and justice. The first three relate to parts of the person: the soul, the high-spirited part, and the body.  This division of the person can also be stated with wisdom in the head, courage in the chest, and self-control in the stomach and genital areas.  Wisdom is the virtue to govern reason in the soul; courage is the virtue to govern one’s high-spirited part; and temperance is the virtue to govern the appetitive part, the body with its various desires.  Justice involves the right rule within each part, and the right ordering of the parts. Various disorderings of the soul are possible when one part is not rightly ruled by virtue and when the parts of a person are not rightly ordered.  A glutton’s not exercising self-control over the appetites and his letting the appetites rule over the two other areas of the soul might be an example.  We might say that such a person is internally disordered.

In Plato’s Republic, the philosopher-king embodies wisdom and exercises rule over the rest of society.  Following him are the guardians, the trained army and officials of the state who exercise courage.  Following them are the rest of the citizens, corresponding to the appetitive part of the soul.

Plato also discusses how different types of government correspond to different arrangements of these classes.  The government that comes closest to Socrates’ vision of the ideal republic is Sparta’s timocracy.  The ruling guardians in Sparta were what he calls the ‘auxiliary guardians’—the military.  The political, non-military guardians trained to rule the state with reason, including the philosopher-king, are ruled by the auxiliary guardians.  Socrates argues that this relationship needs to be reversed.  Sparta’s timocracy, then, equates to the soul being ruled by courage over wisdom.

Corinth, at the time, was ruled by an oligarchy.  An oligarchy is rule by the few, and it is also typically understood that, unlike aristocracies and timocracies that may also be ruled by a few, an oligarchy involves the rule of a few in their own self-interest.  In both a timocracy and an oligarchy, the appetites are restrained, the first by force and the second by an order in society that protects private property.

Athens in the 5th c. BC represented democracy among the Greek city states.  This form of government represents the rule of the appetites for Socrates.  The masses control the government, and they seek unrestrained fulfillment of their desires, which are considered justified in their own right as the exercise of freedom.

Finally, Syracuse had a tyrannical form of government.  For Socrates, this was the worst form of government.  It was a monarchy in which the monarch’s grasp of power serves his own ends.  Base desires rule absolutely, with nothing to hold them back.

Each of these forms of government have their faults, but if a philosopher-king, representing wisdom, is placed in power, the republic will be just.  Such a person needs to be placed in power, even against his own wishes, after having been trained in virtue and governance for years.  He must have no property beyond his basic needs, and he must govern for the citizens, not in his own interests.

Those who formed the government of the United States of America advocated a representative democracy, a republic, more along the lines of Pericles’ Athens than Socrates’ ideal republic.  They had experienced monarchy and determined that self-rule was better than rule by a fallible king.  Socrates’ version of the state assumed that there could be a perfect individual and therefore that person could be given absolute power.  The framers of the American Constitution sought to limit power and place various checks and balances on government precisely because they understood that humans are fallible in many ways.  The government that governs better is not the one that gives individuals power to enforce virtues on the rest of society but the one that reduces the power of individuals and the state because of vices.

What the West faces today is a different philosophy.  It is a post-Christian philosophy that rejects the idea that people have sinful appetites and desires: there is no sin.  Thus, it uses democracy in the way that Socrates feared: all desire is good in itself, and each desire is of the same status as the others.  It goes further than Socrates imagined, too.  The tyranny of desire allows desire to revise nature and define its own reality.  This is expressed vividly in transgender ideology and social control.  Not only is this a disordered society in that the appetites are unrestrained but also in that the appetites rule over reason.  Democracy, said Plato, will devolve into tyranny, and in our present situation, this tyranny is a tyranny of the anti-natural, transgender philosophy.  What we see in the West today is a new social experiment of the worst kind in which persons internally disordered are forcing on the state a similar disorder—unrestrained and unnatural desires.

A further development in the West is the replacement of antiquity’s cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage, self-control, and justice with diversity, equity, and inclusion—each understood within the framework of critical theory.  This follows on from the Enlightenment’s shift from the cardinal virtues to a value system of freedom and equality (and fraternity, for the French).  Freedom, authority of oneself, became empowerment, authority of groups, which, in turn, became diversity. Equality, the treatment of all as equal, became equity, the special treatment of some. Fraternity, a sort of obligatory activism in social solidarity, incorporated inclusion of out-layers and came to be what is now the third member of postmodernity’s triad of values.  In its enforcement, it has equally become an exclusion, a social execution, of any not joining the revolution.  The Postmodern West is a child of the French Revolution, not the American.

Socrates’ timocracy was a meritocracy: people were put into their social roles based on their training and competencies.  Western society rejects merit in the name of equity: people are advanced on the basis of their group identities, whether natural (ethnicity, e.g.) or contrived (gender identities).  Such identities contribute nothing to the task of individuals in a society.  Equity’s new definition, thanks to Marxist theory, means the unequal advancement of individuals in order to advance a perceived social inequity among groups (i.e., to reverse intersectional discrimination).  It amounts to a reverse racism and a rejection of competence. 

Diversity as a cardinal virtue trumps other virtues: it is an absolute value.  Socrates’ interest in promoting people to their rank according to their merits also resulted in diversity.  A person from a lower class could advance, or one from a higher class be demoted, or a foreigner could be promoted in society because of his skills or wisdom, depending on where they best fit in the socialist republic that he envisioned.  The West’s notion of diversity would be for Socrates an example of the rule of the appetites—fulfilling our own desires—rather than rule by wisdom.  There is no wisdom in promoting a foreigner because he or she is a minority over a citizen with the skills needed for the job. 

Finally, in the West, ‘inclusion’ is not about welcoming others but about removing barriers of any sort that hinder the fulfillment of desire.  It also involves enforced approval in the culture, institutions, and state that an individual rejects, such as affirming one’s chosen sexual identity over against their obvious biological identity.  Christianity, in particular, is viewed as a threat and an enemy as it says that there are such things as sins, there is a difference between good and evil, and there is truth, not just opinions that should all be ‘included’ or valued.  There is a God—we are not gods who speak our own little universe into being.  God the Creator has established right and wrong in His creation.  (We may not be able to turn an ‘is’ into an ‘ought,’ but God could and did as Creator; and we certainly cannot turn an ‘ought’ into an ‘is.’)  The West is involved in a self-scrutiny and emolument for past sins that leaves it incapacitated, unable to approve the good in its past.  The very notion of ‘civilization’ is rejected as discriminatory and abusive. Thus, ‘inclusive’ is actually a deconstructive and ‘cancel-culture’ category that wears a welcoming mask.


Ideology and Power: Some Further Examples of Socialism’s Oppression of the Individual. Essay 7 of Justice in the State: Comparisons between Plato’s Republic and the West

 

The previous essay has pointed out that socialism involves collective values, the power of the state, and a disregard for individuals.  Some today might equate socialism primarily with a national health care system, but it is not about how to run a good medical service for all citizens—one could debate that same goal from various understandings of government and the private sector.  There is no more reason to understand socialism as a national health care system than there is to call a country socialist because it has a nationwide educational system.  The essence of socialism lies in ideology and power.  These essays have explored how Plato’s socialist republic articulated a view of social justice that was anything but just, and this should be a warning to those today who imagine that socialism is a kinder and more moral system of government.  In this essay, three further examples of socialism’s oppression of the individual in the Republic will be noted.  Plato discusses education, militarism, and social honours in his socialist timocracy.

1. Education is reduced to training.  It has the goal of training in ways to serve the state.  Those who perform poorly are eliminated from the training and sent to a lower class.  Particularly in view is the training of the guardian class of soldiers.  Like Sparta, the ideal republic is centred around the military training of its citizens and, characteristic of 5th c. Greece in general, the state’s military exploits.  To quote:

[466e] …  “It is obvious that they will march out together, and, what is more, will conduct their children to war when they are sturdy, in order that, like the children of other craftsmen, they may observe the processes of which they must be masters in their maturity … [5.467e] …  “We must mount them when very young,” said I, “and first have them taught to ride, and then conduct them to the scene of war, not on mettlesome war-steeds, but on the swiftest and gentlest horses possible; for thus they will have the best view of their own future business and also, if need arises, will most securely escape to safety in the train of elder guides.” … [5.468a] [Any show cowardice] should be reduced to the artisan or farmer class …

2. The militaristic nature of the ideal state makes courage such a primary virtue that any cowardice should be punished.  In consideration, courage is a social value, while cowardice is associated with individualism.  Socrates continues:

[5.468a] and anyone who is taken alive by the enemy we will make a present of to his captors, shall we not, to deal with their catch [5.468b] as they please? …

3. Social honours for guardian heroes should involve granting them sexual license as a reward. In this, there is an aspect of granting the social elite privileges of exploitation that others are denied.  However, the main motivation for this honour, so to speak, is a service to the state.  The state has an interest in its heroes having an incentive to fight courageously for a sexual reward, and it has an interest in heroes reproducing.  Individual rights are not part of the equation here, just as they are not significant in socialist states in general.  Socrates says,

[5.468a] “And don't you agree that the one who wins the prize of valor and distinguishes himself shall first be crowned by his fellows in the campaign, by the lads and boys each in turn?” … [Socrates adds that the hero should kiss and be kissed by everyone, and Glaucon adds, with his approval, that] [5.468c] … none whom he wishes to kiss be allowed to refuse, so that if one is in love with anyone, male or female, he may be the more eager to win the prize.”  [Socrates provides the further reason:] in order that as many children as possible may be born from such stock. … 

One should not be distracted by the particularites of Socrates’ examples of the state’s socialism.  His socialist timocracy is not the only type of socialism.  Different socialist societies may present themselves differently.  What they have in common is an idealist vision for the state.  It is not only utopian; its ideals drive policies that are pressed into action, and this process inevitably provides ample opportunities to create an oppressively powerful, monstrous state that justifies its actions ideologically.  Secondly, the state does not exist for the individual but the individual for the state.  Thirdly, the socialist state embraces the use of power over people in every way, such as in education, militarism, its system of reward—as seen in the quotations from Socrates.  The final quotation that shows Socrates’ endorsement of sexual license over others for heroes makes the point that, once a state is given power over individuals, it may exploit that power in any number of surprising and unjust ways that it will defend as social justice.  State control and the suppression of the individual’s rights are essential to the definition of socialism.

Plato’s Ideal, Socialist State and Its Many Discontents. Essay 6 of Justice in the State: Comparisons between Plato’s Republic and the West

 

The ideal republic that Plato envisions in the Republic is a monarchy (a non-hereditary, philosopher-king), a timocracy, and a socialist state.  One of the assumptions in Plato’s Republic is that the just society is a society that will require significant social control.  The republic needs to repudiate tyranny, self-interested oligarchy, and democracy.  As a socialist state, like all forms of socialism, requires the ‘just’ republic to (1) enforce its (2) ideal understanding of values and virtues on the population, (3) while maintaining that this action will produce happy citizens.  What Socrates describes as a utopia for justice turns out to be a dystopia of oppression, degraded values and vices, on an inevitably unhappy populace.

Socrates begins by describing how the state needs to enforce certain values regarding property.  He says that guardians must have only the most necessary property.  This would, for example, mean that they should not desire or possess gold.  The attack on possessions is also an attack on individualism.  So, Adeimantus, Socrates’ interlocutor, asks whether guardians would be happy in such a state.  Socrates answers that different people find different kinds of happiness, but if we say that happiness is defined in terms of possessions, leisure, and the like, then we would actually corrupt the hard working farmer, potter, and so forth in their work (4.421).  Poverty and wealth must be avoided (4.421e-422a).  What comes to mind when reading this are the famous, Soviet posters of smiling peasants on collective farms, when, in fact, the communist government murdered or deported tens of thousands of persons owning 8 acres or more of land (kulaks) between 1929 and 1934, confiscated private farms, and caused massive starvation.

Communal unity is another value that requires state control in Socrates’ ideal republic.  This relates to the growth and size of cities, which need to be neither too small nor too large but just the right size to maintain unity (4.423b-c).  Socrates did not envision a classless society, as Communism claims but never achieves.  One can press for equal opportunity, but the natural differences between people inevitably means unequal outcomes, and the enforcement of equal outcomes progresses in a socialist state through much suffering, injustice, and death.  In Socrates’ timocracy, however, where the contribution of people to society is understood in terms of the contribution each can make according to his or her merits, differences remain.  Socrates, for example, does not envision the state without slaves.  Citizens need to be sent up or down according to the class that best fits their ‘natures.’  Such control by the state is needed so that everyone’s work might contribute to the city’s ‘unity’ (4.423c-d).  Communalism should further govern marriages, since wives and the procreation of children should be ‘the proverbial goods of friends that are common’ (4.423e-424a).  The state values of collectivism and communalism oppose marriage and family.

Individualism is also a contrary value to the state.  People need to devote themselves to the collective values determined by the state.  Socrates says, ‘[462c] … “That city, then, is best ordered in which the greatest number use the expression ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’ of the same things in the same way.” … [464a] … and by virtue of this communion they will have their pleasures and pains in common.’  The statement is awkward in translation, but it simply says that possessions, pleasures, and pains are all to be collectivised.  Individualism is opposed, except in the reward of heroism in battle, but even here, the reward goes to the one who abandons self-preservation in fighting for the state.  (On this point, more in a further essay.)

Addressing the happiness of a population ruled by socialist forces and ideals, Socrates claims that the elimination of private property will contribute to a far less litigious society:

[464b] … these helpers must not possess houses of their own or [464c] land or any other property, but that they should receive from the other citizens for their support the wage of their guardianship and all spend it in common. … [464d] … “Then will not law-suits and accusations against one another vanish, one may say, from among them, because they have nothing in private possession but their bodies, but all else in common?

We might call Socrates’ republic a ‘nanny state.’  He avers that it will remove so many cares and indignities of life and leave everyone happy:

[465c] …  the pettiest troubles of which they would be rid, the flatterings of the rich, the embarrassments and pains of the poor in the bringing-up of their children and the procuring of money for the necessities of life for their households, the borrowings, the repudiations, all the devices with which they acquire what they deposit with wives and servitors to husband, and all the indignities that they endure in such matters ... [465d] … “From all these, then, they will be finally free, and they will live a happier life than that men count most happy, the life of the victors at Olympia … [Any happiness of the individual indicated here is not personal but derived from the state, and they] [465e, d] … receive honor from the city while they live and when they die a worthy burial.

Socrates believed that the monarch and the tyrant were most alike.  The difference lay in the former’s desire to produce a just state for the citizens, while the latter desires to use the state for his own gain.  Both exercise power over others; they differ only in their goals for the people.  The philosopher-king is someone who would receive extensive training (merit) to exercise power for the good of the people.  He would not want to rule or gain wealth, unlike the tyrant, but have to be forced to take on the burden of care for the population.

Some Reflections

The evil of socialism lies in large part in its claim to power in order to do good.  Much injustice and wickedness is done once the state gains such power.  Sometimes, some good is done, despite the ineptitude of bureaucracy and incompetence of rulers.  Yet some of socialism’s values are themselves evil, the exact opposite of the good and of justice.  Such, for example, is Socrates’ opposition marriage and the family.  As noted in an earlier essay, he also requires eugenics in the choice breeding of top citizens to produce an improved citizenship and in the death of children that will contribute to the state’s perceived well-being.  His state is, frankly, loveless in his notion of happiness through collective values and of social honour.  In socialist societies, people are more or less slaves of the state, and they are expected to be happy for having no property or parental responsibilities.  Their happiness lies in having all their basic needs met by a state that takes care of them.  Socrates claims that individuals without rights will be happy because they will not have lawsuits over property or bear burdensome responsibilities or have financial difficulties.

As a matter of historical fact, however, socialism proves itself to be a failure time after time.  Idealists, including socialists, are not realists, even if they attempt to solve real social problems.  They are always terrible students of history, since historical facts get in the way of ideals.  In fact, to the extent that they address history, to typically try to rewrite it to favour the outcomes they desire for society in the present. 

Socialist economies do not function well.  The state proves to be ever more oppressive.  Its showcase values appear altruistic, but its communal values undercut the individual, the family, property, freedom, mobility, and so forth.  Socrates must not have been naïve about his socialist vision for the state, since its collectivism and values were to some degree practiced by the Spartans, at war with democratic Athens for much of his lifetime.  As Athens weakened before the armies of Spartan-led forces, Athens’ democracy gave way to tyranny.  Socrates lays the problem of tyranny at the feet of a failed democracy, but he fails to see that his ideal state is very much like the Spartan state that defeated democracy. 

History has shown just how unjust the state becomes the more that power is removed from the citizens as individuals and given to the socialist state that values and enforces communalism and collectivism.  We have Communist Russia, China, Cambodia, and Venezuela as recent examples to offer.  What we need to remember is that the evil society not only excuses the evil it does on the grounds that the communal needs are greater than the individual (claiming to render the greatest good to the greatest number of people), it also sets itself up as the ultimate authority—one under no God but only pursuing a certain vision of virtue, like social justice. 

The genius of Paul in Romans 13.1-7 is not to endorse the state’s authority without qualification—though he does appreciate the state when it acts justly—but in insisting that the state must be under God.  He says, ‘there is no authority except from God’ (v. 1).  He is not saying, as some sometimes maintain, that because God endorses the state, we must accept it as God-given in itself.  Rather, government is under God and therefore has authority insofar as it does what God’s Law upholds.  This view does not endorse one form of government or another, but it does rule out ultimate authority in a state that disregards God and follows its own ideals.

Socrates, for his part, often pays lip service to Greek religion (the Republic begins this way), but his discussion of socialism proceeds from a very human conception of human values, not divine Law.  Even the slight awareness that Socrates shows of religion disappears in socialism.  In communist socialism, religion is regarded as an enemy of the state.  In softer versions of European socialism, the state tolerates a private spirituality, even if the product of a state Church.  Religion is compartmentalized, having no bearing on society, unless it also supports the values and activities of the state. 

This, incidentally, is where the UK is today, in the government’s (including the so-called ‘Conservative’ government’s) fairly successful attempt to remove the Church from any social relevance.  This is also where the Church of England is, happily submitting to a secular society’s values and to the rule of the state as it has, over several decades, rejected orthodox Christian doctrine and ethics.  This is seen in various social issues: sex education in schools, state opposition to pastoral care that entails transformation of sinners with regard to the conversion of sinful passions, interest in some quarters for the state to require the Church of England churches to hold same-sex ‘marriages,’ silencing public evangelism, arresting persons silently praying near abortion chambers, removing Christians from jobs, and so forth.

‘Progressive Evangelicals’ have proven to be a particularly insidious foe to orthodoxy and Reformational Evangelicalism.  Like Socrates, they come with their secularised agenda of ‘social justice’ that only uses Scripture to proof-text their already formed values and activism.  They place activism over theological understanding, and theological values over Biblical interpretation.  The academic disciplines of Biblical scholarship (languages, literature, history) are treated as a colonial power to be rejected so that others might have equal legitimacy in the use of Scripture.  Progressive Evangelicals grab ahold of Biblical values like ‘justice’ and then fill in their meaning from whatever secular society understands—particularly, in our postmodern era, the newly minted values of diversity, equity, and inclusion.

In addition to the identification and definition of ideals, Progressive Evangelicals so identify with secular society that they think of themselves as a majority, not minority voice.  They are, therefore, much in favour of socialism.  The Church is understood not as a prophetic, righteous community over against the state but as a support for all the good that the state does.  They are, therefore, quite supportive of socialism.  They close their eyes to social issues like abortion.  They advocate for the equal place of persons advocating sexualities opposed to their own historic faith.  They underplay Christian identity that highlights holiness and righteousness.  They like to give more power to the state to make bad people become better and better people to do good things.  Though a minority group that is increasingly attacked by the post-Christian majority, these Progressive Evangelicals somehow imagine that giving more power to a socialist state will advance Christian values.  Claiming to be an intellectual elite, they show an amazing ignorance.  The book of Revelation identified the problems with a powerful state and its persecution of Christians.  Christians need to be suspicious and critical of all government, since it is not the Kingdom of God even when governments do some good.  Socialism, however, is shown to be an insidious ‘beast’ as it grasps power and forces its all too human values on society.

What is Conversion? A Lesson from St. Augustine

 In 2 Chronicles 7.14, God tells the Israelites that, if they humble themselves, pray, seek His face, and turn from their wicked ways, He will hear from heaven, forgive their sin, and heal their land (from His judgement on them).  'Turning from their wicked ways' is what is meant by 'conversion.'  This lesson will explore conversion further with a look at the conversion of St. Augustine.

As we move from 2 Chronicles to a full Biblical theology of conversion, the means of conversion comes to focus on Jesus Christ.  2 Chronicles pointed to the temple, a place of prayer and sacrifice as the Israelites came to God.  The New Testament replaces the temple with Jesus Christ, whose sacrificial death for us, for our sins, and for salvation made the temple obsolete because its purposes were fulfilled in Him. There is no turning from our wicked ways that will be sufficient for us to stand before God.  If we hope to present our good works to God as the means of our salvation, we will not be justified but condemned.  Any people hoping to buy their way into God’s eternal presence with the currency of their own goodness will find that the exchange rate is not in their favour.  Our wills, not just our actions, are so in bondage to sin that it is not possible not to sin.  We must obey this master, for we are under his rule and authority.  Our only hope is that God has redeemed us through Jesus Christ from such a master and has made us, by His grace, to be His own.

The Hebrew word for ‘repent’, shuv, means ‘to turn.’  This provides us with a good image to understand conversion.  We walk along a certain path in life, one that continues on and on.  If we are happy with that path, we just continue to walk without much thought about the road ahead.  Periodically, there are opportunities to turn and follow another path.  St. Augustine’s conversion shows that conversion involves three steps: a loathing of his/our empty, sinful path, selves, and life; contrition, that is, a deep sorrow and repentance; and a turning to God, or really a surrender to God, with a deep peace and joy.  Augustine understood conversion not simply as a transaction, or a new system of belief, but also and especially as an emotional process of loathing, weeping, and peace and joy in the Lord.

St. Augustine recounts how he became a Christian (in AD 386) in the book that he wrote called The Confessions.[1]  In his words, he tells the story of how God ‘delivered me out of the bonds of carnal desire, wherewith I was most firmly fettered, and out of the drudgery of worldly business’ (Bk. 8.6.13).  There are two obstacles in his life that made him turn to Christ: being chained to passions of the flesh and not being able to master them, and being so engrossed in the business of life as to ignore the things of God.  Augustine wanted more from life, and he came to realize that he would only find this with God’s help.  He tells how he learned of certain people who came to faith as a result of wanting more than what their lives entailed.  He then confesses to God that, as he listened to these testimonies, God

turned me towards myself, taking me from behind my back, where I had placed myself while unwilling to exercise self-scrutiny; and Thou set me face to face with myself, that I might behold how foul I was, and how crooked and sordid, bespotted and ulcerous. And I beheld and loathed myself; and whither to fly from myself I discovered not (Bk. 8.7.16).

Augustine says that, as a young man, he had even prayed, ‘Grant me chastity and continency [that is, self-control], but not yet(Bk. 8.7.17).  He also chose to pursue what he calls ‘worldly hopes’ but later came to see them as ‘the baggage of vanity’ that they were.  But, when confronted directly with his true condition, Augustine was ‘consumed and mightily confounded with a horrible shame.’  He had no arguments left against turning to God, and found himself left in ‘silent trembling’ (Bk. 8.7.18).

Augustine then spends some time telling how he vacillated.  Wanting to turn to God, he nevertheless considered how great a cost it would be to himself to relinquish the desires of his ‘unclean members’ (Bk. 8.11.27).  He knows that he could not become a Christian and, at the same time, continue in his fleshly desires for they were opposed to God’s holy demands.  But his desires controlled him.  How could he possibly give them up?  Did he even want to give them up?  About this, he wrote,

My will was the enemy master of, and thence had made a chain for me and bound me. Because of a perverse will was lust made; and lust indulged in became custom; and custom not resisted became necessity. By which links, as it were, joined together (whence I term it a chain), did a hard bondage hold me enthralled (Bk. 8.5.10).

Augustine came to be sorry for his sins, however.  We might first only fear God’s judgement for sin, but we must come to a point of sorrow over our sins.  Augustine does not even mention any fear of God’s wrath for the sins he committed, though he might well have done so.  Rather, he expressed sorrow over his life of sin itself, a bondage to a filthy life.  We need to come to the point of regretting our own sin, regretting how it offends God, regretting how we hurt others, and regretting what we are doing to ourselves.  Such regret is a loathing of sin for the horrible work it does.  And a loathing of sin turns into a sorrow that results in conversion, a turning to God.  Having come to loath his sin, Augustine experienced sorrow for his sin.  He began to weep, and he calls this an acceptable sacrifice to God (cf. 1 Pt. 2.5).  His tears of repentance were his sin offering to God, and He identifies his strong emotions as contrition—a heartfelt sorrow for his sins (Bk. 8.12.28-29).  Repentance can be a mental exercise—more of an act of the mind, a resolve to live differently, but contrition is a sorrow of the heart.  Conversion progresses from loathing sin to sorrow to repentance.

Just then, Augustine heard from over the wall a child at play repeatedly saying, ‘Take up and read.’  Augustine had heard how the monk, St. Antony, had been converted upon hearing read a passage from Scripture.  So, Augustine went back to where he had left his copy of Paul’s writings on a bench in the garden and opened the book.  He read two verses from the epistle to the Romans:

Let us walk properly as in the daytime, not in orgies and drunkenness, not in sexual immorality and sensuality, not in quarreling and jealousy. 14 But put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh, to gratify its desires (Rom. 13.13-14, ESV). 

This was the moment of Augustine’s conversion.  He says, ‘No further would I read, nor did I need; for instantly, as the sentence ended — by a light, as it were, of security infused into my heart — all the gloom of doubt vanished away.’  Augustine had passed from darkness into the light of Christ.  He was converted.

Justice in the State: Comparisons between Plato’s Republic and the West. Essay 5: Social Justice, the Power of the State, and Genetic Engineering

 

While Socrates’ initial statements about justice in society were based on observations in nature—specifically, observations about the capacities of men and women—his argument soon left nature behind and turned to ideals.  His discussion of the cardinal virtues of prudence, courage, temperance, and justice provides a way to connect ideals to practices of the state.  In addition to these ideals, Socrates’ vision of the state that wants to pursue justice requires a state with the power to enforce its will on the people.  If we speak of this as ‘social justice,’ we might mean both the ideal virtue of justice and not merely social ethics but also and especially socialism—a powerful, centralised government denying individual liberties in the higher interest of the state.

This sort of ‘social justice,’ then, involves understanding the state as an enlightened, effective, guiding mechanism that removes opposition and enforces its goals on the people for their collective good.  We see this everywhere in Western countries today, where increasingly socialist governments present themselves as virtuous, enforcing social justice on the population throughout all the institutions of society.

For Socrates, social justice needed to involve state control of its citizens.  This began with   selective breeding overseen by the rulers:

[459b] … how imperative, then, is our need of the highest skill in our rulers…. [459d] … “It follows from our former admissions,” I said, “that the best men must cohabit with the best women in as many cases as possible and the worst with the worst in the fewest, [459e] and that the offspring of the one must be reared and that of the other not, if the flock is to be as perfect as possible. And the way in which all this is brought to pass must be unknown to any but the rulers, if, again, the herd of guardians is to be as free as possible from dissension.” … [460b] “And on the young men, surely, who excel in war and other pursuits we must bestow honors and prizes, and, in particular, the opportunity of more frequent intercourse with the women, which will at the same time be a plausible pretext for having them beget as many of the children as possible.” …[1]

Social justice also involved the state’s express interest in births and child care.  Socrates earlier argued that men and women would not be bound by marriage in having sex, and parents and children would not know one another.  The state controlled reproduction in its own interests.  Even incest might be permitted (461e).  This control further extended to deciding which children would live and which would be terminated:

[460c] The offspring of the good, I suppose, they will take to the pen or créche, to certain nurses who live apart in a quarter of the city, but the offspring of the inferior, and any of those of the other sort who are born defective, they will properly dispose of in secret, so that no one will know what has become of them.” … [460e] … [Breeding must be limited to men and women in their prime:] “The women,” I said, “beginning at the age of twenty, shall bear for the state to the age of forty, and the man shall beget for the state from the time he passes his prime in swiftness in running to the age of fifty-five.” … [461b] “if any of those still within the age of procreation goes in to a woman of that age with whom the ruler has not paired him. We shall say that he is imposing on the state a base-born, uncertified, and unhallowed child.” …

We see some similarities with Western socialism today.  Iceland brags that it has no children with Downs Syndrome—they have been terminated by a state that will not have defective citizens that are perceived as a burden to the state.  While the West’s new value of sexual freedom increasingly assumes pre-marital, extramarital, and same-sex ‘marital’ unions as acceptable and even normative, they are similar to Socrates’ state control of sexuality in its disconnection of marriage from procreation.  The West’s insistence on individual rights is increasingly at odds with its own infatuation with socialism, even communism for some.  Either way, however, children are put to death: in the name of women’s so-called rights over their children’s lives or in the name of the state’s interest for ‘healthy’ citizens.  Such arguments are extremely fragile and can easily be extended to the rights of certain citizens over others.  We have seen this in extreme within the past century.  In much less extreme ways, campaigns for ‘social justice’ simply be social pressure to conform to whatever is the current notion of political correctness.  Yet it easily becomes much more, as it was for Socrates, as the state’s notion of the ideal of justice gets pressed upon individuals in the greater interests of the state through socialism.

This is where we are.  People have been arrested for silently praying near state protected infanticide facilities in England.  Street preachers have been arrested.  People speaking against homosexual so-called ‘marriages’ or ‘transgenderism’ are silenced and charged with hate crimes.  Some MPs have proposed a bill to force the Church of England—itself hopelessly compromised in its attempt to reject the Christian faith in favour of British culture—to indulge same-sex ‘marriages’ in its buildings.  Children are being subjected to a non-Christian, state endorsed version of sexual ethics being taught in schools.  The power of the state grows day by day, first along Western values of freedom—freeing the ‘marginalised’ in society—and then simply along the new values of social justice that deny individuals their freedom and that favours state control.



[1] Plato, Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6, trans.Paul Shorey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969).

Facing the Unfinished Task (Great Commission)

This is a notice of my online lecture, 'Facing the Unfinished Task.'  It considers the Great Commission in Matthew 28.16-20 and its challenge to Christians today.

Link: https://youtu.be/Opmdzp1Vzdk


Justice in the State: Comparisons between Plato’s Republic and the West. Essay 4: Socialism’s Promotion of Communalism and Opposition to Individuals, Marriage, and the Family

 

In Plato’s Republic, the ideal state is a form of socialism.  Various terms could be used to capture the sort of government this work describes as the ideal state exhibiting justice.  While it was to be a monarchy, ruled by a philosopher-king, the role of the guardians in governing and protecting the state also makes it an oligarchy (rule by a few), or a timocracy (rule by those deserving honour), or an aristocracy (rule by an elite with the interests of the whole society at heart).  Socrates does not have a wealthy class or nobility in view for his governing aristocracy, and so the word 'timocracy' is best to describe the nature of governance in the ideal state of the Republic.  Years of intense training and selection of both the monarch and the guardians from the very best creates a ruling class fit for the tasks of governing and defending the state.

Socrates also wants to create a socialist state.  In socialism, people live for the state, as opposed to the state existing for the individuals.  Whatever does not contribute to the state is considered a challenge to the state. Free market capitalism, for instance, supports individual interests, often interpreted as greed, and socialism is considered by its proponents as a more ethical, altruistic economic system.  That history provides few examples of this never seems to phase the socialist.  The socialist state also replaces or tries to replace other authorities in society, including religion, education, and even the family.  In socialism, the state wants absolute control, not shared control.  At least, socialist governments tend toward this level of control.  The reason given for assuming this authoritarian rule over society is that the aristocracy believes that it can best deliver to people what they need but do not understand.  People may want justice, but the socialist government has to create just conditions and show people what justice is.

Returning to the ideal republic described by Socrates in the Republic, socialism undermines individualism in every way.  He advocates communitarianism in cohabitation instead of marital boundaries, dwelling in groups, the elimination of the family, and the elimination of parenthood.  He says,

[While people may still marry [cf. 454e], sexual intercourse is not to be limited to marriage on account of the socialist agenda:] [457c] … all that precedes has for its sequel, in my opinion, the following law.” … “That these women shall all be common to all the men, [457d] and that none shall cohabit with any privately; and that the children shall be common, and that no parent shall know its own offspring nor any child its parent.” … [461d] …  a man will call all male offspring born in the tenth and in the seventh month after he became a bridegroom his sons, and all female, daughters, and they will call him father. …

Socrates follows his own logic to its surprising conclusions.  Yet these conclusions are not unlike those reached today in the reckless social experiments of the West, particularly those being presented in the post-Christian era.  Socialism is far more than an economic system.  As with Socrates, socialist countries oppose individualism, other authorities, and the family.  The family unit is under an amazing attack in the West, with pre- or non-marital unions, no fault divorce, blended families, gender dysphoria, same-sex marriage and adoption, and abortion.  In the next essay, we will see that Socrates does discuss abortion.  The socialist state wants to make people be just by taking their money and property to redistribute it according to the socialist concept of justice.  It wants to play the role of parent--or 'nanny.'  It despises religion since the citizens are to be devoted to the state and not obey any other authority.  Free speech is the enemy of state control.  Socrates' collectivism provides a disturbing vision of social justice that the West today is increasingly affirming.

Letter to Paul from Antioch (Satire)

 

What if…?  A letter from Antioch to Paul

 

Dear Paul,

From Antioch, Left Bank of the Orontes Community Fellowship, formerly the Church at Antioch.  Greetings. We pray that your important work in Ephesus continues well.  

On our end, we are proceeding with some conceptual, administrative, and regulatory changes that we need to share with you and the others whom we support.  Certain thought leaders among us have been instrumental in guiding us through this process.  Please find here a brief account of ten of these changes, which we can discuss in more detail as we are able to do.  We ask you to implement these immediately and send us a report in two months.

1.     In our intercultural context, we want to put forward a positive image of ourselves among the other religions.  ‘Conversion’ conveys the wrong message.  Our end goal should be tolerance, constructive dialogue, and coexistence.  We want to affirm people for who they are, not try to change them.  ‘Missionary’ can be replaced with terms that others use in the general workforce, like ‘teacher’ or ‘counsellor,’ but the generic term ‘leader’ is a favourite for us.  In this light, we are very disturbed with reports from others that you are using the term ‘slave’ in regard to your ministry.  ‘Ministry’ is also a problem.  It means service, and it too should be dropped as too demeaning and unappealing.  We would rather not portray ourselves in this lowly light.  Since most overseers are slaves, please also discontinue use of this term for leaders.

2.     You may recall the discussion on your previous visit about how ‘everyone is a missionary.’  While we ourselves were still using the word ‘missionary,’ anything anyone does that is positive and helpful is now the sort of thing we would like to support.  Giving pride of place to proclaiming the Gospel undermined so many good things we want to be doing.  We are now supporting ‘good works,’ a more holistic understanding.  Moreover, the notion that a mere message, the Good News, is powerful rather than effective activism seems to us to be upside down thinking.  We note that you find yourself persecuted and even imprisoned from time to time just for sharing this Gospel message in public, so we suggest that you focus more on activities that attract people to the meetings.  This might be anything from a programme to help the poor to putting on entertainment for the neighbourhoods. We find drag queen reading hours are a great delight, especially for the children.

3.     Our committee believes that it gave you considerable leeway at the outset of your work, laying hands on you and sending you out without any oversight.  As we have matured as an organisation, we now want to engage with you in decision making about the work.  Our operation has grown into an institution, and we also now have a detailed handbook that is included with this scroll.  Of particular importance, any future project will need clearance from our director.  We know that letters take some time to pass between us, but please do not undertake any projects without approval.  We also appreciate that you may have funding from some other sources, but our approval will be necessary for any project you undertake.  The old idea of recognising someone’s calling and blessing them as they go out is far too loose, and we have moved to the business understanding of directors, planning and executive committees, and employees.  Be assured, we value you as our employee.

4.     As your employer, then, we would like you to complete the enclosed training programme.  Your intercultural work will benefit from our training on diversity, but this programme also values equity and inclusion.  In future, make sure that you do not prioritise someone’s maturity in the faith and gifts or merits above the diversity that they bring to the Christian community.  Be in particular lookout for people from excluded minorities, giving them priority over others for any work.  Do not call this reverse discrimination; it is ‘equity,’ which we now define as equal outcomes through inequality.  This is truly social justice.  Also, do not draw harsh lines between the ‘church’ and ‘the world,’ since our goal is to be inclusive and welcoming.  Consider gatherings as places where ‘seekers’ join with those who have made commitments to the community, and relax the standards for the committed members as well.  Avoid the word ‘church’—it is too off-putting for these seekers.  How else can we emphasise love, tolerance, acceptance, and so forth?  In this light, please drop your divisive focus on ‘holiness’ and ‘righteousness.’

5.     We appreciate your use of the Bible in the communities that you have founded in different cities.  Please be aware, however, that it is only a founding document; the authority of the community to interpret it in constructive ways needs to be affirmed.  Speaking of the Bible as God’s Word or as inspired by the Spirit of God seems a little too much, and it is certainly restrictive for the new truths we find and celebrate in other places.  We need to give flexibility to communities to construct their own, contextually relevant and contemporary understandings and practices, without being restricted by outdated ideas and morality from the Bible.

6.     Relatedly, we think our communities should be well educated in other fields of study.  We know you would not argue with this, but trying to bring a Biblical and theological emphasis to everything is unnecessary.  After all, is not all truth God’s truth?  It would be far better for our young people to understand their own context and the needs in that context so that they can respond best.  Not all can be Bible scholars or knowledgeable of historical theology.  Let us understand our work in the public square without these shackles of the more classical curriculum.

7.     Let us be more specific.  We applaud your founding of a small school in Ephesus in the hall of Tyrannus.  Some changes to make to the curriculum that you have shown to us, though, would surely help your students be more contextually relevant and effective.  The social sciences are particularly relevant for people engaging in social work, which is the better way to understand your work and that of others.  We suggest that you replace courses in ‘ministry’ with courses in ‘leadership’; courses in ‘pastoral care’ with ‘practical theology’ and ‘counselling’; courses in ‘mission’ with ‘intercultural studies,’ ‘anthropology,’ ‘comparative religions,’ and ‘geography and demographics.’  Focus on contemporary theology rather than historical theology, and always add ‘and’ to Bible courses: ‘Bible and culture,’ ‘Bible and the poor,’ ‘Bible and suffering,’ and so forth.  Keep the focus on the community’s context and on action, not on theology itself (most theology really is impractical and divisive) or the Biblical text itself.  In that regard, do not offer courses in Biblical languages but in contemporary languages.

8.     We have also been doing some soul searching about our origins in Judaism.  Ancient Israel saw itself in a special relationship with God and, from that perspective, it disparaged the meaningful and beautiful contribution of other religions and ethnicities.  This exclusivism of Judaism can be interpreted as racist and prideful.  We are considering giving reparations to religious groups that were previously offended or somehow injured by ‘our’ behaviour.  Although most in our churches are Gentiles from these other, disparaged groups and ethnicities, would it not be a nice gesture anyway to ask forgiveness and repay them somehow?  We are, in fact, trying to cancel that historical link.

9.     Exclusivism in your theological doctrine also needs to be eliminated.  Remember, we need to go beyond ‘tolerance’ as a value to ‘inclusive.’  We have already had to write John about his claim that Jesus said He was the only way to the Father.  As a rule, ask yourself if you are excluding rather affirming people in what they believe, and choose the path of affirmation always.

10.  Finally, our handling of ethical issues also needs to be addressed.  We have seen some of your sin lists, and we find this approach to what should be inclusive fellowship off-putting.  People generally know what is good and what is not, but saying this so bluntly, and adding that people who do such things will not enter the kingdom of God, is very ugly and confrontational.  After all, who is really to say what is right?  Doing what is loving, that is, affirming, is the better approach to ethics.  We know you have written beautifully about love to the Corinthian churches, but you should have added, ‘Love rejects calling things wrong,’ not ‘love does not rejoice at wrongdoing.’  You have often identified sex outside marriage between a man and a woman as sinful, leaving some to believe that your ‘religion’ is really all about sex.  How can we live in a society with such diversity on sexual matters if we go around saying that God does not approve of people’s sexual identities and activities?  Let’s have less of this and more love, Paul.

We will need to pick up some further issues with you in person, but for now, we believe that we have communicated the need to provide not only oversight but direction to your work in greater detail.  Finally, try to stay out of jail more often, unless your arrest is for burning down public buildings over some perceived social injustice issue that gets you points with the street activists.

Sincerely,

The Administrative Committee

Antioch, Left Bank of the Orontes Community Fellowship

Justice in the State: Comparisons between Plato’s Republic and the West. Essay 3: Equality, Freedom, and Justice

 

Plato’s discussion of the ideal republic began in book 5 by examining equality between men and women, as the previous two essays have noted.  The previous essay discussed inequalities between the sexes as well, since Socrates says that, while men and women are equal in their capacities and common pursuits, they differ in two natural capacities: physical strength and the woman’s ability to bear children versus the man’s ability to beget them.  When we later leave the present discussion of equality, we will move to different premises in the description of justice for individuals and the state.  This will be a move from basing any views on nature to basing them on ideology—perceptions about what are ideals of the good or of justice.  Before doing so, however, I propose that we see what else we can find in Plato’s Republic about equality in a later discussion of types of government, democracy in particular.

Some historical context will be helpful.  When Plato wrote the Republic in c. 375 BC, he evaluated several political options.  Athens had experienced various forms of government in the previous centuries, and various city states at the time had various kinds of government: monarchies, oligarchies, tyrannies, and democracies.  In the 8th c. BC, rule by a monarch gave way to rule by ‘archons’ selected from the aristocracy.  Archons were magistrates with judicial and legislative authority.  An archon originally had to be of noble birth; from Solon’s time, he could also be from the wealthy class.  The list of archons in Athens begins in 682 BC.  The office changed over time, from service for life to ten years to one year.  By the mid-7th c. BC, Athens had nine archons overseeing different aspects of government.

At the end of the 7th c. BC, a powerful archon by the name of Draco introduced ‘draconian’ laws.  Many crimes were punished by death. A powerful oligarchy of aristocrats controlled the land.  Poor farmers could secure loans by pledging their own persons, which led to widespread enslavement of debtors who were fellow Greeks.  In 594 BC, the archon Solon passed a law against this practice, freeing slaves and bringing back Greeks who had been sold abroad.

After Solon, however, a tyrant, Peisistratus, emerged who overthrew Solon’s laws.  Tyranical rule persisted in Athens throughout the 6th c. until 508 BC, when the people resisted and put Cleisthenes into power.  Cleisthenes divided the province of Attica into ten rather than four tribes, and each contributed members representatives drawn from their villages and towns to the Council (Boulē) of Five Hundred.

During the 5th c. BC, Athens flourished and enjoyed a democratic form of government.  In this golden age of Athenian culture and democracy, the archon, Pericles (c. 495-429 BC), spoke eloquently of Athens’ democratic government, according to the historian, Thucydides.  He celebrated the values of equality and freedom in Athens’ democracy, and this contrasted with the government of Sparta, with which Athens was at war for much of the century (Peloponnesian Wars).  Pericles said,

[Our democracy] favors the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private differences; if to social standing, advancement in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition.  [2] The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry with our neighbor for doing what he likes, or even to indulge in those injurious looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they inflict no positive penalty.  [3] But all this ease in our private relations does not make us lawless as citizens. Against this fear is our chief safeguard, teaching us to obey the magistrates and the laws, particularly such as regard the protection of the injured, whether they are actually on the statute book, or belong to that code which, although unwritten, yet cannot be broken without acknowledged disgrace (The Peloponnesian War 2.37.1-3).[1]

In this statement, Pericles’ understanding of democracy involves equality that promotes freedom for individuals: equal justice in private differences; equal advancement on individual merit not because of class; and equal opportunity, including for the poor.  Equality that promotes freedom is different from freedom that is constrained by equality, which Pericles rejects.  For example, he approves of free expression rather than enforced compliance to a standard enforced by the majority.  Equality and freedom must stand in a certain relationship for democracy to flourish.

The years between Pericles and Plato saw certain events that left Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and the likes reluctant to praise democracy.  A coup in Athens overthrew democracy in 411 BC.  It was replaced for a year with a brief, oligarchic government of the Four Hundred.  Athens surrendered to Sparta in 404 BC and was governed by a pro-Spartan oligarchy known as The Thirty for the next eight years.  During this tyranny, in 399 BC, Socrates was put to death. 

Returning to Plato’s Republic, the history of Greece, with its almost constant warfare between city states and in the two Peloponnesian wars in the previous century, explains the focus on guardians in their civic and militaristic roles (books 5 and 6).  The variety of governmental experiments, including democracy, is also a feature of the Republic (books 8 and 9).  When Plato speaks of Athenian democracy, though he speaks theoretically, he has the previous century for reflection.  When he says that democracy is followed by tyranny, he has the events of the previous fifty years to consider.  When he says that the ideal ruler should be a philosopher-king, he creates a new idea of monarchic rule of a king more like an archon, who rules by merit based on his philosophical training.

The ideal republic for Socrates is a meritocracy.  His criticism of democracy is of interest for our purposes.  It involves, he says, the pursuit of personal, unnecessary desires instead of modesty and temperance, and various vices are dressed up as virtues.  The exclusive love of freedom changes freedom itself into tyranny—being ruled by one’s desires.  Democratic freedom considers every desire equal (Republic 8.561), and everyone considers himself equal.  For example, ‘the resident alien feels himself equal to the citizen and the citizen to him, and the foreigner likewise’ (8.563a),

And the climax of popular liberty … is attained in such a city when the purchased slaves, male and female, are no less free than the owners who paid for them. And I almost forgot to mention the spirit of freedom and equal rights in the relation of men to women and women to men (8.563b).

Democracy’s valuing of freedom and equality, according to Socrates, will lead eventually to anarchy, and this, in turn, leads to tyranny because any excess eventually results in its opposite (8.563e).  Therefore,

… the probable outcome of too much freedom is only too much slavery in the individual and the state…. Probably, then, tyranny develops out of no other constitution than democracy—from the height of liberty, I take it, the fiercest extreme of servitude (8.564a).

Tyranny also develops from democracy when factions accusing one another develop in government.  Socrates says, ‘And then there ensue impeachments and judgements and lawsuits on either side’ (8.565c).  People then look for a defender: ‘And is it not always the way of a demos [populace] to put forward one man as its special champion and protector and cherish and magnify him?’ (8.565c).  Thus, the tyrant emerges as a protector who prosecutes opponents.  He promises the abolition of debts, pursues land redistribution, attacks property owners (8.565e-566a), stirs up some war so the people need a leader (8.566e), taxes the people to pay for the war, forcing them to work harder and not plot to remove him (8.567a), and purges any in his government who threaten his power by being brave to criticize him or who are superior to him (great-souled, wise, or rich) (8.567b-c).  This tyrant will need more bodyguards and ones who can be trusted.  He can do this by paying them well and using a foreign bodyguard, which can be done by freeing slaves from the citizens (who would be foreign) and installing them in this position (8.567e).  An interlocutor in the dialogue, Glaucon, adds that the tyrant would also spend the sacred treasures of the city and what he gained from others’ property to require less from the populace (8.568d).  The people would end up enslaved to the slaves (8.569c). 

 

Rejecting tyranny, Socrates’ ideal society is nevertheless a tightly run society with strict laws.  The ruler differs from the tyrant by governing for others, not using government for his own gain.  By rejecting democracy, he sees the goal of government not leaving people to make their own choices but making people live justly.  The philosopher-king’s interest in justice is at odds with freedom and equality.  The type of republic Plato has in mind is a meritocracy, with the philosopher-king and the guardians trained to take their roles in a socialist republic.  Individual freedom is the opposite of this: people need to live for the community, not themselves.  Equality, as we have seen, is valued in regard to equal opportunity, but a meritocracy wants qualified people in the right roles.  Equality is not an absolute, and the differences between people will result in unequal outcomes.

 

The last decade has seen an aggressive and rapid attack on democracy and an ever-increasing attack on Christianity in the West.  This essay has shown how equality and freedom were essential features in Athenian democracy and how they were not appreciated by Socrates in Plato’s Republic.  For Christians, the ideal society would be one under God, not one with unrestrained freedom and equality.  Yet there is no ideal society, and suppression of freedom and equality in democratic government as we are now seeing means an increasingly tyrannical state that persecutes Christians.

 

Plato’s description of justice, however, is an oppressive, socialist society.  The main difference is that Christians understand government as a human and therefore flawed exercise of power.  (The book of Revelation shows this very well.)  The God-given authority in government provides some element of justice (Romans 13.1-7), but it is human and flawed. 

 

The Church offers an alternative society apart from human government.  In it, there is an equality before God and a freedom in Christ from the tyranny of sinful desires.  A prior commitment to God is necessary for equality and freedom to function as they should.  Without this, people remain under a tyranny of sin, free only to exercise their sinful desires in a society that does not differentiate between good and evil as it labels everything as equal.  The alternative is not freedom from everything but a freedom to submit to the reign of Christ, an obedience to righteousness and the empowering presence of the Spirit of God.  This is completely different from Socrates’ republic.  The best human government is that which allows the alternative, Christian society of the Church to flourish.  The problem with trying to establish a Christian state is that it still involves human governance, and giving flawed humans more authority and power produces an oppressive society that does not and will never achieve Christian justice.



[1] Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (London: J. M. Dent; New York, E. P. Dutton. 1910).  Pericles speech includes other examples of freedom.  Throwing open the city to the world, they ‘trust less in system and policy than to the native spirit of our citizens’ (The Peloponnesian War 2.39.1).  In education, instead of painful disciplines to form manliness from the cradle (cf. the Spartans), ‘we live exactly as we please’ (2.39.1).  He says that, unlike other nations, ‘instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all’ (The Peloponnesian War 2.40.2).

The Second Week of Advent: Preparing for the peace of God

[An Advent Homily] The second Sunday in Advent carries the theme, ‘preparation for the peace of God’.   That peace comes with the birth of C...

Popular Posts