Justice in the State: Comparisons between Plato’s Republic and the West. Essay 3: Equality, Freedom, and Justice
Plato’s discussion of the ideal republic began in
book 5 by examining equality between men and women, as the previous two essays
have noted. The previous essay discussed
inequalities between the sexes as well, since Socrates says that, while men and
women are equal in their capacities and common pursuits, they differ in two
natural capacities: physical strength and the woman’s ability to bear children
versus the man’s ability to beget them.
When we later leave the present discussion of equality, we will move to
different premises in the description of justice for individuals and the state. This will be a move from basing any views on nature to basing them on ideology—perceptions about what are
ideals of the good or of justice. Before
doing so, however, I propose that we see what else we can find in Plato’s Republic about equality in a later
discussion of types of government, democracy in particular.
Some historical context will be helpful. When Plato wrote the Republic in c. 375 BC, he evaluated several political options. Athens had experienced various forms of
government in the previous centuries, and various city states at the time had
various kinds of government: monarchies, oligarchies, tyrannies, and
democracies. In the 8th c. BC, rule by a
monarch gave way to rule by ‘archons’ selected from the aristocracy. Archons were magistrates with judicial and
legislative authority. An archon originally
had to be of noble birth; from Solon’s time, he could also be from the wealthy
class. The list of archons in Athens
begins in 682 BC. The office changed
over time, from service for life to ten years to one year. By the mid-7th c. BC, Athens had
nine archons overseeing different aspects of government.
At the end of the 7th c. BC, a powerful archon by the name of
Draco introduced ‘draconian’ laws. Many
crimes were punished by death. A powerful oligarchy of aristocrats controlled
the land. Poor farmers could secure
loans by pledging their own persons, which led to widespread enslavement of debtors
who were fellow Greeks. In 594 BC, the
archon Solon passed a law against this practice, freeing slaves and bringing back
Greeks who had been sold abroad.
After Solon, however, a tyrant, Peisistratus, emerged who overthrew Solon’s laws. Tyranical rule persisted in Athens throughout the 6th c. until 508 BC, when the people resisted and put Cleisthenes into power. Cleisthenes divided the province of Attica into ten rather than four tribes, and each contributed members representatives drawn from their villages and towns to the Council (Boulē) of Five Hundred.
During the 5th c. BC, Athens flourished and enjoyed a democratic form of government. In this golden age of Athenian culture and democracy, the archon, Pericles (c. 495-429 BC), spoke eloquently of Athens’ democratic government, according to the historian, Thucydides. He celebrated the values of equality and freedom in Athens’ democracy, and this contrasted with the government of Sparta, with which Athens was at war for much of the century (Peloponnesian Wars). Pericles said,
[Our democracy] favors
the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy. If we
look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private
differences; if to social standing, advancement in public life falls to
reputation for capacity, class considerations not being allowed to interfere
with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve the
state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition. [2] The freedom which we enjoy in our
government extends also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a
jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry
with our neighbor for doing what he likes, or even to indulge in those
injurious looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they inflict no
positive penalty. [3] But all this
ease in our private relations does not make us lawless as citizens. Against
this fear is our chief safeguard, teaching us to obey the magistrates and the
laws, particularly such as regard the protection of the injured, whether they
are actually on the statute book, or belong to that code which, although
unwritten, yet cannot be broken without acknowledged disgrace (The Peloponnesian War 2.37.1-3).[1]
In this statement, Pericles’ understanding of
democracy involves equality that promotes freedom for individuals: equal
justice in private differences; equal advancement on individual merit not
because of class; and equal opportunity, including for the poor. Equality that promotes freedom is different
from freedom that is constrained by equality, which Pericles rejects. For example, he approves of free expression rather
than enforced compliance to a standard enforced by the majority. Equality and freedom must stand in a certain
relationship for democracy to flourish.
The years between Pericles and Plato saw certain
events that left Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and the likes reluctant
to praise democracy. A coup in Athens
overthrew democracy in 411 BC. It was
replaced for a year with a brief, oligarchic government of the Four Hundred. Athens surrendered to Sparta in 404 BC and
was governed by a pro-Spartan oligarchy known as The Thirty for the next eight
years. During this tyranny, in 399 BC, Socrates
was put to death.
Returning to Plato’s Republic, the history of Greece, with its almost constant warfare
between city states and in the two Peloponnesian wars in the previous century,
explains the focus on guardians in their civic and militaristic roles (books 5
and 6). The variety of governmental
experiments, including democracy, is also a feature of the Republic (books 8 and 9).
When Plato speaks of Athenian democracy, though he speaks theoretically,
he has the previous century for reflection.
When he says that democracy is followed by tyranny, he has the events of
the previous fifty years to consider.
When he says that the ideal ruler should be a philosopher-king, he
creates a new idea of monarchic rule of a king more like an archon, who rules
by merit based on his philosophical training.
The ideal republic for Socrates is a meritocracy. His criticism of democracy is of interest for our purposes. It involves, he says, the pursuit of personal, unnecessary desires instead of modesty and temperance, and various vices are dressed up as virtues. The exclusive love of freedom changes freedom itself into tyranny—being ruled by one’s desires. Democratic freedom considers every desire equal (Republic 8.561), and everyone considers himself equal. For example, ‘the resident alien feels himself equal to the citizen and the citizen to him, and the foreigner likewise’ (8.563a),
And the climax of popular liberty … is attained in such a city when the purchased slaves, male and female, are no less free than the owners who paid for them. And I almost forgot to mention the spirit of freedom and equal rights in the relation of men to women and women to men (8.563b).
Democracy’s valuing of freedom and equality, according to Socrates, will lead eventually to anarchy, and this, in turn, leads to tyranny because any excess eventually results in its opposite (8.563e). Therefore,
… the probable outcome of too much freedom is only too much slavery in the individual and the state…. Probably, then, tyranny develops out of no other constitution than democracy—from the height of liberty, I take it, the fiercest extreme of servitude (8.564a).
Tyranny also develops from democracy when factions accusing one another
develop in government. Socrates says, ‘And
then there ensue impeachments and judgements and lawsuits on either side’
(8.565c). People then look for a
defender: ‘And is it not always the way of a demos [populace] to put forward
one man as its special champion and protector and cherish and magnify
him?’ (8.565c). Thus, the tyrant emerges
as a protector who prosecutes opponents.
He promises the abolition of debts, pursues land redistribution, attacks
property owners (8.565e-566a), stirs up some war so the people need a leader
(8.566e), taxes the people to pay for the war, forcing them to work harder and
not plot to remove him (8.567a), and purges any in his government who threaten
his power by being brave to criticize him or who are superior to him (great-souled,
wise, or rich) (8.567b-c). This tyrant
will need more bodyguards and ones who can be trusted. He can do this by paying them well and using
a foreign bodyguard, which can be done by freeing slaves from the citizens (who
would be foreign) and installing them in this position (8.567e). An interlocutor in the dialogue, Glaucon,
adds that the tyrant would also spend the sacred treasures of the city and what
he gained from others’ property to require less from the populace (8.568d). The people would end up enslaved to the
slaves (8.569c).
Rejecting tyranny, Socrates’ ideal society is nevertheless a tightly run
society with strict laws. The ruler
differs from the tyrant by governing for others, not using government for his
own gain. By rejecting democracy, he
sees the goal of government not leaving people to make their own choices but
making people live justly. The
philosopher-king’s interest in justice is at odds with freedom and
equality. The type of republic Plato has
in mind is a meritocracy, with the philosopher-king and the guardians trained
to take their roles in a socialist republic.
Individual freedom is the opposite of this: people need to live for the
community, not themselves. Equality, as
we have seen, is valued in regard to equal opportunity, but a meritocracy wants
qualified people in the right roles.
Equality is not an absolute, and the differences between people will
result in unequal outcomes.
The last decade has seen an aggressive and rapid attack on democracy and
an ever-increasing attack on Christianity in the West. This essay has shown how equality and freedom
were essential features in Athenian democracy and how they were not appreciated
by Socrates in Plato’s Republic. For Christians, the ideal society would be
one under God, not one with unrestrained freedom and equality. Yet there is no ideal society, and
suppression of freedom and equality in democratic government as we are now
seeing means an increasingly tyrannical state that persecutes Christians.
Plato’s description of justice, however, is an oppressive, socialist
society. The main difference is that
Christians understand government as a human and therefore flawed exercise of
power. (The book of Revelation shows
this very well.) The God-given authority
in government provides some element of justice (Romans 13.1-7), but it is human
and flawed.
The Church offers an alternative society apart from human
government. In it, there is an equality
before God and a freedom in Christ from the tyranny of sinful desires. A prior commitment to God is necessary for
equality and freedom to function as they should. Without this, people remain under a tyranny
of sin, free only to exercise their sinful desires in a society that does not differentiate
between good and evil as it labels everything as equal. The alternative is not freedom from
everything but a freedom to submit to the reign of Christ, an obedience to
righteousness and the empowering presence of the Spirit of God. This is completely different from Socrates’
republic. The best human government is
that which allows the alternative, Christian society of the Church to
flourish. The problem with trying to
establish a Christian state is that it still involves human governance, and
giving flawed humans more authority and power produces an oppressive society
that does not and will never achieve Christian justice.
[1] Thucydides,
The Peloponnesian War (London: J. M.
Dent; New York, E. P. Dutton. 1910).
Pericles speech includes other examples of freedom. Throwing open the city to the world, they ‘trust
less in system and policy than to the native spirit of our citizens’ (The Peloponnesian War 2.39.1). In education, instead of painful disciplines
to form manliness from the cradle (cf. the Spartans), ‘we live exactly as we
please’ (2.39.1). He says that, unlike
other nations, ‘instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the
way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at
all’ (The Peloponnesian War 2.40.2).
Comments