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Suicide in the Graeco-Roman World

 

Introduction

In this essay, my focus on suicide in the Graeco-Roman world will begin with the Hippocratic Oath and then turn to Greek drama (briefly) and philosophy.  Special attention will be given to Stoic views on suicide.  I will also draw out contrasts to early Christian writings.

Hippocratic Oath and Assisted Suicide

The Hippocratic Oath is the oldest known and longest lasting oath among medical practiioners.  First for our interests, the oath has them pledge:

I will use those dietary regimens which will benefit my patients according to my greatest ability and judgement, and I will do no harm or injustice to them (Hippocratic Oath 1).[1]  

Hippocrates elsewhere calls on practitioners ‘to help, or at least not do harm’ (Epidemiae 1.11).[2]  Another ancient author, Apuleius, attests to this practice among physicians in his fictional work, Metamorphoses: a physician says that practitioners of medicine were not to be responsible for anyone’s death or destruction (X.11). 

Second, Hippocrates proscribed two harmful practices in the oath that caused harm:

I will not give a lethal drug to anyone if I am asked, nor will I advise such a plan; and similarly I will not give a woman a pessary to cause an abortion.

The first proscribed practice, giving a lethal drug to anyone, could be understood as aiding someone in poisoning someone else, or it could be understood as aiding someone in suicide.  No distinction is made between these alternatives, though, because the point is that a doctor was not to use his knowledge of drugs to kill someone.  He was to do no harm.[3]

The second practice is, more literally, not to give a woman a ‘harmful pessary’—the Greek[4] has no reference to abortion, as in the quoted English translation.  However, ‘harmful pessary’ would refer to abortion.  Anthony M. Vintzileos has argued that the pessary reference is to contraception.[5]  While pessaries could be used for contraception, they were also used to purge the uterus after birth or of a child that died in the womb.  A ‘harmful pessary’, however, only fits the use of pessaries to abort the child.  Both the first and second examples refer to harmful practices in medicine and are examples of causing death.

Suicide and Greek Drama: Honour

The plot of Sophocles play, Ajax, advances as the Greek hero tries to live nobly despite the fate of the gods.  If fate is unavoidable, suicide allows one still to maintain one’s honour.  The notion that suicide may be honourable in certain situations is a key theme in Greek and Roman cultures.  Sophocles presents the story of a Greek victor, Ajax, in the battle against Troy.  Having lost the greatest honour for the battle to Odysseus, Ajax goes temporarily mad and disgraces himself.  Thinking he was killing the Greek generals for insulting him, he instead slew the army’s livestock.  Having returned to his senses, he says, ‘The options for a noble man are only two: either live with honor, or make a quick and honorable death’ (Ajax 480).[6]  He then considers suicide.  His wife, Tecmessa, says that fate decreed by the gods determine the events in one’s life: ‘Ajax, my lord, the fortune that humans are compelled to endure is their gravest evil’ (485).  The chorus says that Ajax shares ‘his tent with a madness of divine origin’ (609-610).  Ajax says, ‘And so hereafter I shall, first, know how to yield to the gods, and, second, learn to revere the Atreidae [the sons of Atreus, king of Mycenae]. They are rulers, so we must submit’ (666-668).

Suicide and Philosophy in Antiquity

The oath not to administer a lethal drug to anyone if asked is a prohibition against assisted suicide.  In both of these, one can see the importance of divine authority rather than civil law establishing accountability: no authority can contradict divine authority in the matter of when one departs this life.  If we were to consider this today, we would see the problems created in our day as legislators debate bills for assisted suicide and abortion.  In this, they overstep their authority both in meddling with medical practice—about which one might well argue that they are not adequately trained for such oversight—and in assuming a role in life and death that belongs to God alone.  Pliny the Younger comments about a friend’s request for suicide that the doctors hold that the gods have laid down the plan of life and death (Letters 1.22).  The medical practitioner’s oath under divine oversight recognizes that God gives and takes life, not the doctor.

In antiquity, both suicide and abortion were regular and legal practices.  According to the Hippocratic Oath, neither was to be performed by a doctor.[7]  Moreover, philosophical schools offered distinctions in suicide that provided some basis for accepting it.  Among these, the Pythagorean school clearly demurred.[8]  Socrates, agreeing with the Pythagorean, Philolaus, claimed that anyone worthy of philosophy would not take his own life, as this is not permitted (Phaedo 61c-d).[9]  Socrates’ reason for opposing suicide was that humans are the chattels of the gods and have no right to kill themselves by their own design. 

Quite possibly, the Epicureans agreed.  Affirming the view that one should pursue pleasure and virtue in life, one might have expected them to allow suicide in certain instances.  Yet, according to Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus wrote (the work has not survived) that the Sage (one living the good life described by his philosophy) should hold himself worthy of life even if he loses his sight (The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers X.X).[10]  Indeed, he says that Epicurus wrote on the last day of his life, though suffering immensely from a strangury (painful urination) and dysentery, that it was a blissful day as he contemplated past conversations rather than his afflictions (The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers X.X; cf. Seneca, Letters to Lucilius 66.47).

Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle on Suicide

Plato wrote several short works to do with Socrates’ trial and death: Euthephro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo.  In 399 BC, Socrates stood trial on the charges of impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens.  Since the manner of his execution was by means of drinking hemlock, the question of enforced suicide arises. He did not put up the defence that he might have, perhaps because the charges were politically motivated.  Socrates says in Plato’s Apology: ‘But, gentlemen, it is not hard to escape death; it is much harder to escape wickedness, for that runs faster than death’ (Apology 39a).[11]  Much of his reasoning to accept the verdict of the court has to do with not fearing death and what happens to the soul afterwards.

In Phaedo, Socrates explains why suicide is wrong: ‘Yet I too believe that the gods are our guardians, and that we are a possession of theirs.... Then, if we look at the matter thus, there may be reason in saying that a man should wait, and not take his own life until God summons him, as he is now summoning me.’  Yet, his view of the afterlife and of the soul led him to say that, when faced with death, one must not hold back.[12]  David Ebrey lists four arguments in Phaedo for the proposition that the soul is immortal:[13]

1.     The Cyclical Argument: as the body dies, its opposite, the soul, must not die. [Socrates believed in reincarnation.]

2.     The Recollecting Argument: since people seem to know some things apart from being shown the evidence, they must be recollecting this knowledge.  If so, the soul existed before birth.

3.     The Kinship Argument: things are either incorporeal or corporeal.  Incorporeal things are invisible and immortal, and the soul is not corporeal but incorporeal.

4.     The Final Argument: since particulars (e.g., a beautiful thing) participate in the universals, i.e., eternal forms (Beauty per se), and the soul participates in the universal forms of life, it must be eternal.

Plato’s (or Socrates’) view of death is that it frees the eternal soul from being pulled down and confused in the world of particulars (cf. Phaedrus 245c-249d) that keep it from seeing the forms themselves purely.  The soul, freed from the body, can ascend to gaze upon pure forms such as the Good, Justice, Beauty, and so forth.  He says,

the body is constantly breaking in upon our studies and disturbing us with noise and confusion, so that it prevents our beholding the truth, and in fact we perceive that, if we are ever to know anything absolutely, we must be free from the body and must behold [66e] the actual realities with the eye of the soul alone. And then, as our argument shows, when we are dead we are likely to possess the wisdom which we desire and claim to be enamored of, but not while we live. For, if pure knowledge is impossible while the body is with us, one of two thing must follow, either it cannot be acquired at all or only when we are dead; for then the soul [67a] will be by itself apart from the body, but not before. And while we live, we shall, I think, be nearest to knowledge when we avoid, so far as possible, intercourse and communion with the body, except what is absolutely necessary, and are not filled with its nature, but keep ourselves pure from it until God himself sets us free. And in this way, freeing ourselves from the foolishness of the body and being pure, we shall, I think, be with the pure and shall know of ourselves all that is pure... (Phaedo 66d-67a).[14]

In his Laws, Plato discusses the matter of where to bury a person who has committed suicide and makes distinctions between persons’ motivations.  The person who does so simply for reasons of sloth or unmanly cowardice is to be buried in an unmarked grave, apart from others, and in barren and nameless districts of no note.  The exceptions noted are when the death is ordered by the State or when it is the result of ‘some disgrace that is beyond remedy or endurance’ (9.873).[15]

Aristotle also delineated types of suicide that were shameful.  Discussing the virtue of courage, the virtue lying between the vices of cowardice and rashness, Aristotle says,

to seek death in order to escape from poverty, or the pangs of love, or from pain or sorrow, is not the act of a courageous man, but rather of a coward; for it is weakness to fly from troubles, and the suicide does not endure death because it is noble to do so, but to escape evil (Nicomachean Ethics 1116a).[16]

Stoicism and Suicide: Quality of Life, Freedom, Self-Sufficiency, and Honour

The topic of suicide received particular consideration from Stoics—especially Seneca.  While not all supported it (such as Epictetus), the general argument was was favourable to suicide in certain circumstances.  Particular virtues, as interpreted by the Stoics, leant their support: freedom, self-sufficiency, honour (or nobleness), and quality of life.

Chrysippus compares knowing when to commit suicide to knowing when to leave a party.  He offers five reasons:[17] 

Reasonable departures from life take place in the same five ways: 1) because a pressing matter turns up, as in the case of someone commanded by the Pythia [the oracle of Apollo at Delphi] to slit his throat to save his own city, on the brink of destruction.  Or 2) because tyrants rush in, forcing us to do shameful deeds or say forbidden things; or 3) because a serious illness prevents the soul from using the body as an instrument for a long time.  For this reason Plato too does not approve of the dietetic part of medicine, because of its effect of moderating the disease and turning it into a chronic condition, but approves of the surgical and the pharmaceutical parts, to which Archigenes, the army doctor, resorted.  So Sophocles too says:

It will not become a good doctor
To chant incantations over a malady calling for the knife (Ajax, 582).

Or 4) because of poverty, as Theognis says well: “…Escaping from poverty, it is necessary to…”  Or 5) because of dementedness.  For just as drunken stupor would break up a party there, so here too can one have oneself depart from life because of dementedness.  For being demented is nothing but natural intoxication, and intoxication, nothing but self-induced dementia. The same consideration applies here.

Epictetus, a later Stoic philosopher in the 1st c. AD, argued against suicide.  He says that one should

... wait for God, till he shall give the signal and dismiss you from this service; then return to him. For the present, be content to remain at this post where he has placed you. The time of your abode here is short and easy to such as are disposed like you; for what tyrant, what robber, what thief, or what court can be formidable to those who thus count for nothing the body and its possessions. Stay, nor foolishly depart (Epictetus, Discourses I.9).[18]

 Epictetus commends the Stoic ethic that one should be or do well what is the reality one faces, whether it be hunger, thirst, a fever, or death.  The philosopher’s concern is not to be concerned with externals but with his reason.  He needs to tend to fear, anger, desire and not what others have and what has no value (Discourses III.10).  He says one should study not only how to die (that is, pursue reason and not worry about the body, as Plato said) but also how to be tortured, banished, scourged, and all that belongs to others—otherwise, you will be a slave among slaves even if a consul (Discourses IV.1).

 1. Quality of Life

Not all Stoics held Epictetus’ aversion to suicide, but they did agree with his view of indifference to one’s circumstances.  Such indifference could, however, lead one to commit suicide when one’s quality of life was hopelessly diminished.  A century earlier, Cato the Younger (1st c. BC), who would go on to commit suicide some time later, argued

When a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life (as stated in Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum III.18.60).[19]

In the 1st c. AD, the Stoic writer, Seneca, had much to say on the subject.  He says of suicide,

 

The best thing which eternal law ever ordained was that it allowed to us one entrance into life, but many exits. 15. Must I await the cruelty either of disease or of man, when I can depart through the midst of torture, and shake off my troubles? (Letters LXX, 14-15, ‘On the Proper Time to Slip the Cable’).[20]

 Elsewhere, Seneca says, 

I shall not avoid illness by seeking death, as long as the illness is curable and does not impede my soul. I shall not lay violent hands upon myself just because I am in pain; for death under such circumstances is defeat. But if I find out that the pain must always be endured, I shall depart, not because of the pain but because it will be a hindrance to me as regards all my reasons for living. He who dies just because he is in pain is a weakling, a coward; but he who lives merely to brave out this pain, is a fool (Epistle LVIII, 36, ‘On Being’).

 Finally, Seneca upholds the quality of life as a value to consider regarding suicide:


You wish to live; well, do you know how to live? You are afraid to die. But come now: is this life of yours anything but death?...  It is with life as it is with a play, – it matters not how long the action is spun out, but how good the acting is. It makes no difference at what point you stop. Stop whenever you choose; only see to it that the closing period is well turned’ (Letter LXXVII, 18).

 Ironically, for all Seneca’s writing about suicide, he was forced by the Emperor, Nero, to take his own life in AD 65 (cf. Tacitus, Annals 15.60-64).  A response to this line of argument might be the point advocated by the Jewish writer in Alexandria, Philo.  He says, 

Such evils, that which appears at first to be the lightest of all misfortunes, namely, poverty, is naturally calculated to produce, when it is the result of the vengeance of God; for even though cold, and thirst, and want of food may be terrible, still they might at times be objects worth being prayed for, if they only produced instantaneous death without any delay. But when they last a long time and waste away both body and soul, then they are calculated to reproduce the very greatest of the calamities recorded by the tragic poets, which appear to me to be described in a spirit of fabulous exaggeration (Rewards 136).

The idea that one should end one’s life when circumstances become too burdensome for one reason or another is rejected in the New Testament.  James says,

Count it all joy, my brothers, when you meet trials of various kinds, 3 for you know that the testing of your faith produces steadfastness. 4 And let steadfastness have its full effect, that you may be perfect and complete, lacking in nothing (James 1.2-4).

Also, Paul tells slaves remain in the state in which they were called by God to be Christians.  He says, that one who was called while in the state of slavery is actually God’s freedman, and one who was called as a free person is actually God’s slave (1 Corinthians 7.23).  He concludes, ‘So, brothers, in whatever condition each was called, there let him remain with God’ (7.24).  Peter, speaking to slaves unjustly treated by their masters, says, ‘For this is a gracious thing, when, mindful of God, one endures sorrows while suffering unjustly’ (1 Peter.1.19).  Furthermore, he sets before them the example of Jesus:

For to this you have been called, because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example, so that you might follow in his steps. 22 He committed no sin, neither was deceit found in his mouth. 23 When he was reviled, he did not revile in return; when he suffered, he did not threaten, but continued entrusting himself to him who judges justly. 24 He himself bore our sins in his body on the tree, that we might die to sin and live to righteousness. By his wounds you have been healed. 25 For you were straying like sheep, but have now returned to the Shepherd and Overseer of your souls.

Indeed, the suffering of the righteous is a theme running throughout the Old Testament.  The lament form of a psalm is the most common in the book of Psalms.  The narrative of Israel is a narrative of a people’s suffering (sometimes as punishment).  This theme culminates in Jesus’ death on the cross.  People shaped by such a powerful narrative are going to approach matters very differently from the Stoic teaching just outlined.  Paul, for example, can set before the Corinthian church his suffering as a positive thing.  He boasts:

far greater labors, far more imprisonments, with countless beatings, and often near death. 24 Five times I received at the hands of the Jews the forty lashes less one. 25 Three times I was beaten with rods. Once I was stoned. Three times I was shipwrecked; a night and a day I was adrift at sea; 26 on frequent journeys, in danger from rivers, danger from robbers, danger from my own people, danger from Gentiles, danger in the city, danger in the wilderness, danger at sea, danger from false brothers; 27 in toil and hardship, through many a sleepless night, in hunger and thirst, often without food, in cold and exposure. 28 And, apart from other things, there is the daily pressure on me of my anxiety for all the churches. 29 Who is weak, and I am not weak? Who is made to fall, and I am not indignant? (2 Corinthians 11.23-29).

Paul’s reason for boast in such hardships is that the Lord told him, ‘My grace is sufficient for you, for my power is made perfect in weakness’ (2 Corinthians 12.9).

The Christian tradition leads to a different ethic than suicide, and it lays a challenge before those who know a troubled person.  This we see in the 2nd c. AD writing, the Shepherd of Hermas:

Tell all who are able to do right not to stop; to work at good works is beneficial to them. Moreover, I say that every person ought to be rescued from distress, for one who is in need and suffers distress in daily life is in great anguish and hardship. 3 So whoever rescues such a person from misery wins great joy for himself. For the one who is troubled by distress of this sort is afflicted with the same anguish as one who is in chains. For many people, because of afflictions of this kind, commit suicide when they can no longer endure them. Therefore, whoever knows about the misery of someone like this and does not rescue that person commits a great sin and becomes guilty of that person’s blood (114: 2).

2.     Freedom

 To quality of life, one might add freedom as a value that could support the decision to commit suicide.  In On Anger, Seneca says, 

 

We shall not condole with such a chain-gang of prisoners so wretched, we shall not urge them to submit to the commands of their butchers; we shall show that in any kind of servitude the way lies open to liberty'. If the soul is sick and because of its own imperfection unhappy, a man may end its sorrows and at the same time himself. To him to whom chance has given a king that aims his shafts at the breasts of his friends, to him who has a master that gorges fathers with the flesh of their children, I would say: ‘Madman, why do you moan? Why do you wait for some enemy to avenge you by the destruction of your nation, or for a mighty king from afar to fly to your rescue? In whatever direction you may turn your eyes, there lies the means to end your woes. See you that precipice? Down that is the way to liberty. See you that sea, that river, that well? There sits liberty — at the bottom. See you that tree, stunted, blighted, and barren? Yet from its branches hangs liberty. See you that throat of yours, your gullet, your heart? They are ways of escape from servitude. Are the ways of egress I show you too toilsome, do they require too much courage and strength? Do you ask what is the highway to liberty? Any vein in your body!’ (III.15.3-4).[21]

 

Conquered people often faced the choice of suicide or enslavement.  Seneca suggests that suicide is the way to freedom in this or any other impossible situation.

 

3.     Self-Sufficiency and Freedom

 Related to the virtue of freedom is the Stoic virtue of autarkes (contentment, satisfied, self-sufficient), a term that Paul also uses in Philippians 4.  Paul understood this virtue differently, however.  Paul did not promote self-sufficiency but contentment or satisfaction with God’s oversight of one’s life.  He says, ‘I do not speak because of need, for I have learned in whatever circumstance I am to be satisfied (autarkes) (Philippians 4.11). When he says, ‘I can do all things through him who strengthens me’ (4.13), he does not mean that he is empowered to do anything but that he can live contently whatever the circumstances because of God who strengthens him to face everything.  His examples are that he has learned to be brought low or to abound, have plenty or go hungry, and have an abundance of things or be in need (4.12).  Philippians 4.13 has a parallel in Paul’s letter to the Romans, where lists a host of calamities (tribulation, distress, persecution, famine, nakedness, danger, or sword) and then concludes, ‘No, in all these things we are more than conquerors through him who loved us’ (8.37).  For Paul, important ways to sustain contentment in the face of calamity are to rejoice in the Lord, omit anxiety through prayer, supplication, and giving thanks (Philippians 4.4-6).  In this way, the all-surpassing peace of God will ‘guard your hearts and minds in Christ Jesus’ (4.7).  Thus, one does not attain self-sufficiency through indifference to whatever one’s circumstances or contentment through remaining in control, even if by suicide.  Rather, one attains contentment through dependence upon God and praying to the One who is in control of our lives and circumstances.

 

Within Stoicism, virtue is determined according to one's being satisfied and self‑sufficient (autarkeia and autarkes mean both) with one's position in the divinely ordained universe.  Stoic determinism necessitates an ethic of inward satisfaction that is not dependent on one's situation.  Thus, Epictetus writes:

 

"He is free, whom none can hinder, the man who can deal with things as he wishes.  But the man who can be hindered or compelled or fettered or driven into anything against his will, is a slave.  And who is he whom none can hinder?  The man who fixes his aim on nothing that is not his own.  And what does `not his own' mean?  All that it does not lie in our power to have or not to have, or to have of a particular quality or under particular conditions...." (Discourses IV, i.70‑76). 

 Or consider the Stoic, Roman emperor of the 2nd century AD, Marcus Aurelius:

 

Efface the opinion, I am harmed, and at once the feeling of being harmed disappears; efface the feeling, and the harm disappears at once (To Himself iv.7).

 In Stoicism, autarkes involves avoiding any attempt to control the circumstances beyond one’s control and being in control over one’s attitude towards such circumstances.  One must come to peaceful terms with destiny.  Freedom is acceptance of one's lot and being in control of one’s attitudes; contentment and self‑sufficiency are a matter of "owning" one's lot instead of being owned by it. Thus, one denies the feeling of being harmed in life in order to have this sort of freedom and contentment.  This Stoic philosophical perspective could support the belief in taking one’s own life, and, for Stoics like Seneca, it did.  Suicide was one area where a person could control one’s circumstances with defiant self-assertion.  A suicide (or assisted suicide, if help was needed) would keep one in control and free from circumstances beyond one’s control.

 4. An Hounourable or Noble Act

 Thus, Seneca understood suicide as a pathway of freedom.  He also claimed, as in our brief note about suicide in Greek drama, that suicide could be honourable or noble, what some today would call dying with dignity:

 

An expedition will be incomplete if one stops half-way, or anywhere on this side of one's destination; but life is not incomplete if it is honourable. At whatever point you leave off living, provided you leave off nobly, your life is a whole. Often, however, one must leave off bravely, and our reasons therefore need not be momentous; for neither are the reasons momentous which hold us here (Letter LXXVII, 4, ‘On Taking One’s Own Life’).

 Seneca offers a couple of examples of noble suicide.  One is of a sickly old man, another of a Spartan boy who, when enslaved, killed himself rather than serve as a slave.  The former Seneca commends for not holding onto life when death is inevitable.  The latter he commends for bravery, saying, ‘Will you not borrow that boy's courage, and say: "I am no slave!"? Unhappy fellow, you are a slave to men, you are a slave to your business, you are a slave to life. For life, if courage to die be lacking, is slavery’ (Letter LXXVII, 15).

 To conclude this presentation of notions of suicide in antiquity, Aelian tells a story of a noble suicide.  An Indian, Calanus, determined to free himself from his body’s bonds.  He mounted a pyre and stood unflinchingly until he died.  Alexander the Great was present to see this and said that Calanus had defeated more than he had in all his conquests because he overcame the enemies of pain and death (Historical Miscellanies V. 6).

 Paul, too, speaks of death as the final enemy (1 Corinthians 15.26).  Yet he argues in this chapter of 1 Corinthians that Jesus Christ has overcome death by being raised from the dead.  Death, however, remains an enemy until a future conquest of Jesus of death for all those who have died in Him, for they, too, will be resurrected with a body like His.  If death is an enemy, one does not overcome it by dying.  One overcomes it with life.

 This resurrection body, Paul says, will be imperishable (v. 42).  If there is no resurrection, one might as well give oneself to pleasure before death overtakes us (v. 32).  The resurrection places a value on the body and on life itself.  Paul says that the present body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within us such that we are to glorify God in our bodies (1 Corinthians 6.19-20).  We have a purpose to live out in this present body (Philippians 1.21: ‘For me to live is Christ, and to die is gain’), which is subject to suffering and death, while we hope to be with Christ after death and for the day of resurrection when Christ Jesus returns.  In 2 Corinthians, Paul says of his life’s difficulties: We are  

always carrying in the body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus also may be manifested in our bodies. 11 For we who live are always being given over to death for Jesus’ sake, so that the life of Jesus also may be manifested in our mortal flesh. 12 So death is at work in us, but life in you.... 16 So we do not lose heart. Though our outer self4 is wasting away, our inner self is being renewed day by day. 17 For this light momentary affliction is preparing for us an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison, 18 as we look not to the things that are seen but to the things that are unseen. For the things that are seen are transient, but the things that are unseen are eternal (4.10-18).

Thus, the Christian lives life for Christ and conquers death with Christ.  Life in Christ, a purpose for living, and the hope of the resurrection provide a certain, Christian perspective that opposes suicide and assisted suicide.

The hope of life with Christ after death and of the resurrection body also means for the Christian that holding onto this life as though it is all we have is unchristian.  We live out this life with its suffering and challenges to fulfill the purposes of God, but we do not advocate expensive medical care, especially late life and other circumstances, simply to live another day—in front of the television with a respirator.  As Paul says about death, ‘we do not grieve as others do who have no hope’ (1 Thessalonians 4.13).  We do not take our lives in suicide, but we also do not value this life as though it is all we have.


Previously: Assisted Suicide: What Sort of Society Do We Wish to Be?



[1] Hippocrates, Hippocratic Oath, trans. Michael North (National Library of Medicine, 2002); online: Hippocrates, Hippocratic Oath, Hippocratic Oath (accessed 3 December, 2024).

[2] Hippocratic Opera, ed. H. Kuehlewein, I (1894), p. 190.

[3] Philo calls for the execution of someone administering a lethal medication or one that does not kill but disables a person, such as leaving him or her mentally incapacitated.  See Philo, Laws 3:98-99.

[4] It reads: ‘οὐδὲ γυναικὶ πεσσὸν φθόριον δώσω’.

[5] Anthony M. Vintzileos, ‘Revisiting the evolution of the Hippocratic Oath in obstetrics and gynecology,’ American Journal of Obstetrics & Gynecology, Volume 230, Issue 5 (May 2024), pp. 469.e1 - 469.e5; online: Revisiting the evolution of the Hippocratic Oath in obstetrics and gynecology - American Journal of Obstetrics & Gynecology (accessed 3 December, 2024).

[6] Sophocles, The Ajax of Sophocles. Ed. Sir Richard Jebb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1893).

[7] Soranus’s Gynecology (I.XIX) lists many of the contraceptives and abortifacient remedies used by people at the time.  He does not describe the use of instruments for abortion as he rejects such methods.  Tertullian, De Anima 25.5-6 describes a blunt barb that dismembers the child and a bronze needle or embryo knife that cuts the baby’s throat in the womb.

[8] See the discussion in Ludwig Edelstein, The Hippocratic Oath, Text, Translation and Interpretation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1943), pp. 14-17; online: The Hippocratic oath, text, translation and interpretation : Edelstein, Ludwig, 1902-1965 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive (accessed 2 December, 2024).  Edelstein argued that the proscription against suicide in the Oath and in the Pythagorean school suggests that the Oath originally came from that philosophical school.

[9] This dialogue takes place after Socrates had been condemned to death by suicide from a drink of hemlock.  In Roman times, too, a person could be ordered to commit suicide.

[10] C. D. Yonge translation, online: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/57342/57342-h/57342-h.htm#BOOK_X (accessed 11 January, 2025).

[11] Plato, Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 1, trans. Harold North Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966).

[12] Elsewhere, Plato rejects the idea that people considered whatever life after death might involve when committing suicide.  In The Republic, Socrates asks: ‘How about belief in the underworld and its horrors? Do you think that makes people fearless in the face of death, makes them choose death in preference to defeat or slavery?’  And the answer to the question was: ‘Of course not’ (386b).  Plato, The Republic, trans. Tom Griffith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); online: Plato The Republic (Cambridge, Tom Griffith).pdf.

[13] David Ebrey, Plato’s Phaedo: Forms, Death, and the Philosophical Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023).

[14] Plato, Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 1, trans. Harold North Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966).

[15] Plato, Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 10 & 11, trans. R.G. Bury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967 & 1968).

[16] Aristotle, Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934).

[17] Ioannes ab Arnim, ed., Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, Vol. 3, paragraph 768 (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1903), pp. 190-191, tr. Yukio Kachi; online: CHRYSIPPUS(c. 280-c. 206 B.C.)The Stoics’ Five Reasons for Suicide | The Ethics of Suicide Digital Archive (accessed 26 December, 2024).

[18] Epictetus, The Discourses of Epictetus, with the Encheridion and Fragments, trans. George Long (London: George Bell and Sons, 1890).

[19] Cicero, On Ends, trans. H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931).

[20] Moral Letters to Lucilius, Vol. 2, trans. Richard Mott Gummere (Loeb Classical Library; London: William Heinemann, 1920).  This translation is used here of other letters of Seneca.

[21] Lucius Annaeus Seneca, ‘On Anger,’ in Moral Essays, trans. John W. Basore (London: Heinemann, 1928).

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